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This dissertation consists of three chapters with the common ground of eco-
nomic decision making, a subject which is at the heart of Economics.
In the first chapter, entitled ”Decision Making with Rational Inattention”, I
and Maximilian Mihm study an axiomatic model of decision making with costly
information processing. In this regard, we first provide a set of intuitive axioms
for a decision maker’s preferences over menus of acts from which she even-
tually makes a choice of an act. We then show that these preferences can be
represented by a novel information acquisition model where choices of acts can
be improved by using costly information. Our focus on preferences over menus
allows us to uniquely identify the parameter’s of the model from choice data:
a utility function, a prior belief and an information cost function. The cost func-
tion, in particular, is compatible with the Blackwell order. Moreover, the model
establishes an axiomatic foundation for the models of rational inattention which
are widely applied in the literature.
In the second chapter, entitled ”On Representation of Monotonic Preference
Orders”, I and Tapan Mitra investigate the relation between scalar continuity and
representability of monotone preference orders in a sequence space. Scalar conti-
nuity is shown to be sufficient for representability of a monotone preference or-
der and easy to verify in concrete examples. Generalizing this result, we show
that a condition, which restricts the extent of scalar discontinuity of a mono-
tone preference order, ensures representability. We also relate this condition to
the well-known order dense property, which is both necessary and sufficient for
representability.
In the third chapter, entitled ”Rational Inattention and Choice of Optimal In-
formation”, I study the choice problem of a rationally inattentive decision maker
modeled according to the first chapter of this dissertation. In this work, I give
a characterization for optimal information choices when the cost function is lin-
ear. In addition, the characterization result is applied on a simple buyer-seller
model where the buyer is rationally inattentive to the riskiness of the seller. It
is found that the optimal price should be non-monotonic in the degree of the
buyer’s attentiveness.
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CHAPTER 1
DECISION MAKING WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION
1.1 Introduction
In the age of the Internet, smart phones, and the 24 hour news cycle, an abun-
dance of information is available at the push of a button. Yet introspection
should suffice to attest that assimilating the wealth of information into actions
is constrained by one’s limitations on attending to information.1 Information is
money, attention is scarce, and thus people must allocate their attention to the
information they deem most relevant to their decisions.2
The attention allocation problem has been recently introduced into economic
analysis to explain some important phenomena such as the price stickiness puz-
zle, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), ineartial reactions to shocks, Sims (1998,
2003) and business cycle dynamics, Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007). It has been
also used in finance to explain home equity bias puzzle, Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2010), to examine dynamic asset pricing theories, Peng and Xiong
(2006) and to study models of mutual funds, Garcia and Vanden (2005) and de-
centralized trade, Golosov et al. (2012).3
The literature models the problem with a fully rational decision maker who
needs to make decisions in an uncertain world. Yet prior to making a decision,
1In cognitive psychology, “attention [is] considered a resource to be allocated to particular
mental processes [where] it is paid out on demand to facilitate selected aspects of information
processing.” Picton et al. (1986, p. 19).
2“... a wealth of information [means] a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that
attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.”
Simon (1971)
3See Veldkamp (2011) for a detailed discussion of the literature modeling economic agents
with limited attention, and see the references therein.
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she can actively seek information in order to be able to make better choices.
However, she might be unable to absorb all the information available due to her
scarce attention. Despite its intuitive appeal and important implications, the lit-
erature incorporating the problem of attention allocation into decision making
has not yet obtained a behavioral foundation. This work aims to fill this gap
by understanding attention scarcity as a limitation on the ability to integrate in-
formation into state-contingent consequences. In this regard, we provide in a
menu-choice setting a simple set of axioms from which we derive several mod-
els of decision making with scarce attention.
Our contribution to the literature can be summarized in two folds: (i) First,
by focusing on preferences over menus, we are able to uniquely identify at-
tention scarcity from choice behavior, and thereby clarify the decision theoretic
foundations of the models using attention allocation problem. In doing this, we
naturally provide a set of falsifiable conditions that one can test with the choice
data to verify the validity of these models. (ii) Second, with our axiomatic re-
sults we are able to propose a novel model of decision making with costly atten-
tion which in turn broadens the scope of the existing models and hence might
guide the applied research.
1.1.1 Preview of the decision problem
Our decision domain is a variation on the menu choice problem first proposed
by Kreps (1979) to study preference for flexibility, and used extensively in the
recent decision theory literature on subjective state spaces, Dekel et al. (2001),
self-control problems, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), contemplation and thinking
2
costs, Ergin and Sarver (2010); Ortoleva (2012), minmax regret, Stoye (2011), and
subjective learning, Lleras (2010); Dillinberger and Sadowski (2011).
There is a finite set, S, of states of the world. A decision maker (DM) faces
choice problems both before and after the realization of a state s ∈ S. Ex-ante the
DM chooses over menus of Anscombe-Aumann type acts. An act is a mapping
from S into lotteries over a set of consequences. A menu is a finite collection
of such acts. Limitations on attention manifests ex-post, when the DM processes
information about the realized state to make a better choice from the menu.
However, since the DM’s knowledge about the state depends on her ability to
process information, choices in different states of the world will now be random
variables, and therefore not observable. Instead, we therefore focus on the ex-
ante preferences over menus – which reflect preferences over the type of decision
problems the DM would like to face ex-post – and ask when such preferences
reveal the anticipated attention scarcity in an unmodeled choice from menus in
the future. The timeline in Figure 1.1 summarizes the order of events.
 
[5] Choice from menu 
[3] Information about 
state is transmitted 
[1] Choice over menus 
[2] State s in S is realized 
[4] Information processing by DM 
[6] Objective randomization is realized  
[7] DM receives consequence  
Figure 1.1: Order of decisions and resolution of uncertainty
3
1.1.2 Preview of the representation
For a rational agent facing a subjective cost of information processing, prefer-
ences over menus allow us to characterize the observable implications of atten-
tion scarcity. In particular, we provide an axiomatic representation result (see
Theorem 1) for the preferences of a DM who evaluates a menu M according to
















d pi(s) − c(p)
}
(1.1)
where Eu is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on lotteries, Σ is a
countably infinite space of signals, ∆(S× Σ) is the set of all joint distributions on
the (state × signal) product space and c is an information cost function.
In the background is the interpretation that the DM decides ex-ante on a plan
for allocating scarce attention before making ex-post choices from menu M. At-
tention scarcity is captured formally by the utility functional (1.1) via the sub-
jective cost c associated with information contained in joint distributions. The
properties of c are therefore crucial to our interpretation of (1.1). In particular,
there exists a unique distribution pi over states such that c(p) = ∞ whenever
pS , pi, so that pi admits a natural interpretation as the DM’s subjective prior
over the state space. The function c otherwise satisfies all basic properties de-
manded of a measure of information: It is (i) non-negative, convex and lower
semi-continuous, (ii) equal to zero for product measures with marginal pi (i.e.,
joint distributions which contain no posterior information about states), (iii) de-
pends only on probabilities in the signal dimension, and (iv) satisfies the data
processing inequality, a basic monotonicity condition that a measure of infor-
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mation “should” satisfy Cover and Thomas (2006, Chapter 2). Due to the clear
parallels with modeling of information in Sims (1998, 2003), we call c an infor-
mation cost function, and call the representation in (1.1) a utility representation
with variable attention.
The signal space Σ, of course, is not a primitive in our setting; it is an en-
dogenous construction of the representation that obtains the meaning of a signal
space only through the choice of a joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), and through
the manner in which the DM utilizes the information that latent signals convey
about states. In particular, the DM uses information in joint distributions as a
Bayesian expected utility maximizer. Corresponding to each joint distribution
p ∈ ∆(S×Σ), there is a family of likelihood functions for observations on signals,
{p(σ|s)}s∈S. After observing a signal σ ∈ Σ, the DM translates the information
from the likelihood of signals into a posterior over the state space, p(s′|σ), via
Bayes rule. She then chooses from menu M the act that maximizes her expected
utility for the posterior. The realized state, s ∈ S, affects the likelihood of signal
realizations and, hence, the information which the posterior distribution con-
tains about the true state. Since the realized state is a priori uncertain, the DM
uses her prior pi to calculate the expected value of the ex-post choices from the
menu.
1.1.3 Preview of the axioms
The axioms that characterize utility with variable attention are surprisingly sim-
ple given the rich information theoretic content of the representation. In addi-
tion to standard weak order, monotonicity, continuity and weak independence
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conditions, the key behavioral postulate is a variable attention (VA) axiom that is
related to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (see Figure 1.1). VA is simi-
lar to the contemplation aversion axiom in Ergin and Sarver (2010), although in
our domain it has a different interpretation. To motivate, we adapt an example
in Ergin and Sarver (2010) to our setting.
Suppose a DM is choosing a restaurant to visit with friends. A state corre-
sponds to the quality of dishes available at each restaurant, an act corresponds
to the choice of a dish, and a menu corresponds to the choice of a restaurant. Be-
fore meeting with her friends, the DM can review restaurants online, in newspa-
pers and magazines, to obtain information about the quality of dishes. An infor-
mation processing strategy might correspond to a plan to look at certain web-
pages, newspaper or magazine articles, and she can actively tailor her strategy
to the restaurant under consideration. For example, if her friends suggest Italian
food, the DM might research “Italian dining” online, if they suggest Japanese
food she might direct attention towards Japanese dining websites. But she will
not be able to study all restaurant reviews; even if much of the information is
publicly available, she may have insufficient cognitive resources to study them
all, or simply have better things to do with her time.
Now suppose with enough effort spent studying reviews first, the DM ex-
pects to make an equally good choice at both the Italian and Japanese restau-
rants. She tells her friends that she is indifferent between the two restaurant
options, and they decide to toss a coin. When would the DM like to know
the outcome of the coin toss? If a decision over restaurants is made before she
spends time on research, she can vary her attention according to the chosen
restaurant. She is indifferent between the restaurants, and could reasonably be
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indifferent with regards to this early randomization. However, if her friends
want to toss the coin later, the DM faces a more complex attention allocation
problem. To make an equally well-informed choice at both restaurants she must
commit more time to research, i.e. pay more attention to available information.
As a result, we posit that a DM who intends to actively allocate scarce atten-
tion between multiple information sources would prefer the coin to be tossed
before she decides how to allocate attention. In fact, the DM might strictly prefer
the Italian restaurant over the delayed randomization, because late resolution
only complicates her attention allocation problem. VA therefore postulates that
a DM indifferent between two menus will at least weakly prefer each menu to a
randomization resolved after variable attention has been allocated.
1.1.4 Outline of the paper
We provide additional motivation and discussion of the VA and other axioms
in Section 1.2, after introducing the formal decision model. Section 1.3 then
presents our main results. Theorem 1 gives the axiomatic characterization of
the utility representation with variable attention in (1.1). Proposition 1 shows
that mutual information – a measure of information that is commonly employed
in applications of rational inattention – is a special case of our cost function.
Theorem 2 gives a representation result for a utility function with constrained at-
tention, in which inattention is modeled in terms of an information constraint set
(a special case of an information cost function). Proposition 2 shows that the
information constraint set can again be defined in terms of mutual information,
so that the finite Shannon capacity model – the particular functional form sug-
gested by Sims for rational inattention modeling – is contained as a special case.
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Theorem 3 incorporates a further restriction on inattention, and characterizes
a utility function with fixed attention that formally establishes the link between
our model of decision making and models of subjective learning. Section 1.4
provides behavioral criteria for comparative statics on (in)attention. Section 1.5
discusses related literature and Section 1.6 concludes. Formal proofs are given
in an Appendix.
1.2 A Decision Model with Costly Attention
This section formalizes a decision environment that is suitable for eliciting at-
tention scarcity from choice data, and provides a number of behavioral postu-
lates for the preferences of a rational agent for whom attending to information
is costly.
1.2.1 Decision environment
Let S be a finite set of states of the world (or simply states), which represent all
uncertainty relevant for the payoffs that the DM can receive. The power set of
S is denoted 2S. An element E ∈ 2S is called an event.
The set Z denotes the set of all possible consequences, and ∆(Z) denotes the
set of all simple probability distributions on Z. An element of ∆(Z) is called a
lottery. For any two lotteries p,q ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ [0, 1], the lottery αp + (1 − α)q
assigns probability αp(z) + (1 − α)q(z) to each consequence z ∈ Z. The set of
Anscombe-Aumann acts (or simply acts), denoted F , is the set of all functions
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f : S → ∆(Z).4 We denote by FC the set of all constant functions f ∈ F for which,
in all s ∈ S, f (s) = p for some p ∈ ∆(Z). Mixtures on F are defined pointwise in
the usual way: For any f , g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], α f +(1−α)g : s 7→ α f (s)+(1−α)g(s).
The alternatives amongst which the DM must choose prior to the realization
of a state of the world are finite subsets of F . We denote by M the set of all
such finite subsets of F , and call a typical element M ∈ M a menu. For any
f ∈ F , { f } denotes the singleton menu that contains only act f . We denote the
set of all singleton menus by MS . With a slight abuse of notation, {p} denotes
the singleton menu that contains only the constant act p ∈ FC (i.e., the constant
act s 7→ p), and MC denotes the set of all constant, singleton menus. The sets
MS andMC are in a natural one-to-one relation with the set F and the set ∆(Z),
respectively. Finally, for any M,N ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1], αA + (1 − α)B ∈ M denotes
the menu {α f + (1 − α)g ∈ F | f ∈ A , g ∈ B} ∈ M. We observe that with respect to
this mixture operation,M is a mixture space.
1.2.2 Axioms
We consider a DM with preferences over menus described by a binary relation
% onM, and interpret the statement M % N to mean that the DM weakly prefers
menu M over menu N. Denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % by 
and ∼, respectively, with the usual interpretations. We now state a collection of
axioms to describe preferences of a DM who is a fully rational agent facing a
latent, subjective cost of information processing, but who fully anticipates lim-
itations on information processing at the time of expressing preferences over
4The space of acts F is the reformulation by Fishburn (1970) of the decision domain first




Axiom 1 (Weak Order (WO)) (i) Given M,N ∈ M, then M % N or N % M, (ii)
Given L,M,N ∈ M, then L % M and M % N implies L % N.
WO is the standard requirement that preferences be complete and transi-
tive.5 Our primary behavioral postulate on a weak preference order is directly
related to the attention allocation problem of a DM. Recalling the restaurant
choice example, a DM may be indifferent between two menus M and N on the
basis of quite different plans about how to allocate attention before making an
ex-post choice. It seems reasonable to posit that she would be indifferent also
to an objective randomization over the menus, as long as randomness is re-
solved before she allocates attention. But we assume throughout that objective
randomization occurs after choices from menus. The late resolution of objec-
tive randomization might complicate the attention allocation problem. As such,
variable attention states that the DM will at least weakly prefer not to randomize.
Axiom 2 (Variable Attention (VA)) Given M,N ∈ M, then M ∼ N implies M %
αM + (1 − α)N for all α ∈ (0, 1).
As the name suggests, VA allows variable attention, so that attention –
viewed as the cognitive resources used to process information about states of
the world – can be actively allocated to the most useful information for any
given choice problem. Since the attention allocated to information varies with
menus, VA is permissive of preference reversals due to any randomization that
5Completeness in particular is a strong rationality requirement in a rich choice domain, and
it could be interesting to relax the assumption to model a DM who is indecisive about the infor-
mation she may be able to attend to in the future. We leave this exercise for further research.
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can complicate the attention allocation problem (i.e., the DM might prefer M to
N, but prefer (1/2)N + (1/2)L to (1/2)M+ (1/2)L when mixtures of M with L com-
plicate the attention allocation problem more than mixtures of N with L). Our
next axiom restricts the scope of such reversals when randomizing with single-
ton menus, as with a singleton menu there is no ex-post choice to make. As such,
randomization with singleton menus complicates the active attention allocation
problem of a DM in a restricted way only.
To motivate, a singleton menu could correspond to a restaurant with a strict
table d’hoˆte (i.e., no choice over dishes). Suppose now that a DM and her friends
will randomize over an a` la carte restaurant and a table d’hoˆte restaurant. The
likelihood of an a` la carte restaurant might well influence the attention alloca-
tion problem. If there is only a small probability that she ends up at the a` la
carte restaurant, it may be optimal to allocate very little attention to restaurant
reviews at all. If the probability is high, there is much more incentive to try and
find pertinent reviews. However, which table d’hoˆte restaurant is being consid-
ered should not affect the allocation of attention. Reviews will not improve the
DM’s choice at a table d’hoˆte restaurant, because the menu is fixed, and so her
attention should be allocated to find information about the a` la carte restaurant.
As such, weak singleton independence postulates that for a fixed randomiza-
tions with a singleton menu, changing the singleton menu should not lead to
preference reversals.
Axiom 3 (Weak Singleton Independence (WSI)) Given M,N ∈ M, f , g ∈ F and
α ∈ (0, 1), then
αM + (1 − α){ f } % αN + (1 − α){ f }
⇔ αM + (1 − α){g} % αN + (1 − α){g} . (1.2)
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To motivate our final behavioral axiom, suppose that the DM and her friends
are choosing between an Italian and a Japanese restaurant, both of which have
a fish and a meat option. The DM may be uncertain about whether meat or fish
dishes are better in general, but if she knows that she prefers the Italian meat
over the Japanese meat, and the Italian fish over the Japanese fish, then we posit
that she should prefer to go to the Italian restaurant. After all, no matter what
information she attends to, or what she would choose at the Japanese restaurant,
the Italian restaurant has an option that she prefers. The following monotonicity
condition embodies this basic principle.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity (MON)) Given M,N ∈ M such that for all g ∈ N there
exists f ∈ M with { f (s)} % {g(s)} for all s ∈ S, then M % N.
MON subsumes two standard dominance conditions:
(1) Restricted to singleton menus, MON reflects the usual monotonicity con-
dition invoked in an Anscombe-Aumann settings to obtain state indepen-
dent payoffs: If { f }, {g} ∈ MS , and { f (s)} ∈ MC is preferred to {g(s)} ∈ MC
for all s ∈ S, then MON implies { f } % {g}.
(2) MON also clearly implies a “preference for flexibility” (Kreps, 1979): If
M,N ∈ M, and M ⊃ N, then MON implies M % N.
Behaviorally, MON therefore assumes that the DM understands fully the state-
contingent prizes associated to each act, understands the content of every menu,
and is free to choose from menus. However, MON is permissive of inattention
to manifest as an attribute of the DM’s understanding about the occurrence of
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external states. In fact, we show in Section 1.4, that alternative ways of strength-
ening MON characterize both maximal and minimal inattention, thereby illus-
trating formally that MON does not restrict the inattention towards external
states faced by our DM at all.
Finally, we require two more technical conditions. Both are natural adapta-
tions of axioms in the literature, but they are not falsifiable with finite choice
data.
Axiom 5 (Mixture-Continuity (MC)) Given f , g ∈ F and M ∈ M, then the sets
{α ∈ [0, 1] : α{ f } + (1 − α){g} % M} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : M % α{ f } + (1 − α){g}} are closed.
Axiom 6 (Unboundedness (UB)) There exist p,q ∈ ∆(Z) with {p}  {q} such that
for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists r ∈ ∆(Z) satisfying either {q}  α{r} + (1 − α){p} or
α{r} + (1 − α){q}  {p}.
MC adapts the usual mixture-continuity condition employed in Anscombe-
Aumann settings to menu choice. Together with WO and MON, its purpose
is to guarantee the existence of constant-singleton equivalents: For all M ∈ M
there exists some pM ∈ ∆(Z) such that M ∼ {pM}. UB is used in a number
of “arbitrage” arguments to establish uniqueness properties. It is essentially
the condition used by Maccheroni et al. (2006) to identify uniquely a grounded
cost function in the representation of variational preferences. We utilize their
derivations in our own proofs, but rely more on UB as it also establishes the
special role played by the prior pi in our representation.
13
1.3 Representation Results
This Section states our main result: A representation theorem for preferences
satisfying the axioms of Section 1.2. We also study a number of special cases
of the representation in (1.1), that provide alternative restrictions on the type of
(in)attention exhibited by a DM. Before stating results, we require some notation
and definitions.
1.3.1 Preliminaries
Given a discrete product space A×B, we denote by ∆(A×B) the set of probability
measures p : 2A×B → [0, 1], and endow this space with the weak*-topology.6 If
p ∈ ∆(A × B), pA denotes the marginal distribution of p on A (or simply the A-
marginal of p), defined by pA(EA) := p(EA × B) for all EA ∈ 2A. Likewise, pB
denotes the B-marginal of p, defined by pB(EB) := p(A × EB) for all EB ∈ 2B.
If p ∈ ∆(A× B), p(.|b) denotes the conditional distribution on A given b ∈ B, and
defined by p(EA|b) := p(EA × b)/pB(b) whenever pB(b) > 0 and p(EA|b) = pA(EA)
when pB(b) = 0. Note that for pB(b) > 0, p(.|b) is simply the Bayesian update
of the distribution pA on observing b ∈ B, given the dependence between the
random experiments A and B when they are governed by the joint probability
distribution p. The condition p(.|b) = pA when pB(b) = 0 is simply a convention
(it is without loss of generality in the following to assume any arbitrary distri-
bution after conditioning on the observation of an experimental outcome with
marginal probability zero). Likewise, p(.|a) denotes the conditional distribution
6In the decision theory literature the term probability measure often refers to finitely addi-
tive probability measures. Throughout, we follow the nomenclature in probability theory and
reserve the term probability measure for measures that are also countably additive.
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on B given a ∈ A defined by p(EB|a) := p(a × EB)/pA(a) whenever pA(a) = 0 and
p(EB|a) = pB(EB) when pA(a) = 0.
For any joint distribution p ∈ ∆(A × B), there exists a unique product measure,
denoted p¯, associated to p and defined by p¯(EA × EB) = pA(EA)pB(EB) for all
EA ∈ 2A and EB ∈ 2B. We denote the set of all product measures on A × B by
∆¯(A × B) (i.e., p ∈ ∆(A × B) is in ∆¯(A × B) if and only if p(EA × EB) = pA(EA)pB(EB)
for all (EA, EB) ∈ 2A × 2B). We note that ∆¯(A × B) is a convex subset of ∆(A × B).
If p, q ∈ ∆(A × B), p is said to be sufficient for q, denoted p % q, if there
is a Markov kernel7 on B × 2B such that q(EA, EB) =
∫
B
K(b, EB)dp(EA, b) for all
(EA, EB) ∈ 2A×2B. If A and B are viewed as two random experiments, the Markov
kernelK can be viewed as an ex-post manipulation of the observations from ran-
dom experiment B. Such manipulations do not provide additional information
about the random experiment A as they depend only on realizations of the exper-
iment B. Blackwell (1953) therefore introduced the ordinal relation% on ∆(A×B)
to capture the idea that p contains at least as much information as q.8 We denote
the symmetric part of % by ' (i.e., p ' q if p and q contain equal information).
The sufficiency relation is an ordinal measure of the information that a ran-
dom experiment B conveys about a random experiment A, when randomness is
governed by a particular joint distribution p ∈ ∆(A× B). The information theory
literature has also proposed numerous cardinal information measures. Although
any non-negative functional on ∆(A × B) could (in principle) serve as an infor-
mation measure, there are certain properties that a useful information measure
7See Bauer (1995, p. 305) for the definition of a Markov kernel.
8Although sufficiency is a purely statistical (i.e., objective) description of the information that
one random experiment contains about another, Blackwell (1953) established a formal equiva-
lence to numerous alternative definitions of informativeness motivated by decision theoretic
arguments and measures of uncertainty Kihlstrom (see, e.g., 1984, for a detailed exposition).
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should satisfy: (a) It should be equal to zero for product measures (under which
the random experiments A and B are independent), (b) it should depend only
on the probabilities associated with events in the product space A×B, not on the
“names” or “identities” of events, and (c) it should satisfy the monotonicity con-
dition that if p % q, then at least as much information should be associate with p
as q. Property (c) is often called the data processing inequality, reflecting the idea
that post-processing of data should not provide new information (Cover and
Thomas, 2006).
An especially prominent example of an information measure is mutual infor-












dp(a, b) . (1.3)
As a function on ∆(A × B), mutual information is convex, lower semi-
continuous and satisfies properties (a)-(c). Mutual information is only one of
many information measures that have been proposed in the information the-
ory literature, but it is the particular information measure that has generally
been employed in applications of rational inattention in macroeconomics and
finance.
9In the definition of mutual information, the standard convention 0 log(0/0) = 0 is used.
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1.3.2 Components of the representation
In our representation, S is a given (i.e., primitive) state space. Σ refers to a
countably infinite set which we interpret as a latent signal space, with typical
element (or signal) denoted σ ∈ Σ. As we do not propose to observe how the DM
processes information, Σ obtains the meaning of a signal space only once there
is a joint distribution on the S×Σ product space. Of course, a joint distribution is
not observable either, but our main result shows that a DM satisfying the axioms
of Section 1.2 acts as if she is choosing a joint distribution on S × Σ, subject to a
cost of the information contained in the distribution. The latter is captured by
an information cost function.
Definition 1 (Information Cost Function) Given a prior pi ∈ ∆(S), we say that a
convex, lower-semicontinuous function c : ∆(S × Σ) → [0,∞] is an information cost
function (relative to pi) if c satisfies the following properties:
(i) Focused on prior pi: c(p) = ∞ whenever pS , pi,
(ii) Grounded at null information: c( p¯) = 0 for all product measures p¯ ∈ ∆¯(S× Σ)
for which p¯S = pi,
(iii) Data processing inequality: p % q implies c(p) ≥ c(q).
Convexity, lower-semicontinuity, grounded at null information, and the data
processing inequality are central properties for information measures in the in-
formation theory literature. As such, an information cost function is an infor-
mation measure.
There is one important caveat. Measures of information usually depend only
on the probabilities of events, and not the “names” or “identities” of events. An
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information cost function satisfies this condition only in the signal dimension.
Property (iii) implies that cost of attending to information depends only on the
probabilities associated to elements of Σ (not their identities). This is natural in
our setting as Σ is not a primitive of the decision environment. The interpre-
tation of Σ as a signal space comes only from the probabilities associated to its
elements. However, the identities of states are crucial, as the state space is the
basic primitive reflecting uncertainty about the real world. In our representa-
tion theorem, property (i) of an information cost function therefore constrains
the DM to choose joint distributions with S-marginals equal to a unique prior pi
on the state space, reflecting the primitive status of states.
Finally, we require some notation for utility functions on lotteries. Given a





Also, given two functions u1, u2 : Z → R, we sometimes write u1 ≈ u2 if there
exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u1 = α u2 + β (i.e., when u1 and u2 are equivalent
up to positive affine transformations).
1.3.3 A utility representation for variable attention
We are now able to state our main result, a characterization of preferences satis-
fying the axioms in Section 1.2.
Theorem 1 Let % be a binary relation onM. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) % satisfies the WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB axioms.
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(ii) There exist a prior pi ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and an
information cost function c : ∆(S × Σ) → [0,∞] (relative to pi), such that for all
M,N ∈ M:
M % N ⇔ V(M) ≥ V(N) , (1.5)
















d pi(s) − c(p)
}
(1.6)
Moreover, if (pi1, u1, c1) and (pi2, u2, c2) represent the same preference relation % onM,
then pi1 = pi2 and there exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u1 = α u2 + β and c1 = α c2.
In view of Theorem 1, we call a preference relation % on M satisfying ax-
ioms WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with variable atten-
tion; and we call the representation functional in (1.6) a (pi, u, c)-utility function for
variable attention onM.
Proof sketch of Theorem 1. The first step in the sufficiency part of the proof of
Theorem 1, is to construct a framework where the objects of choice are simple
functions defined on S×Σ. We call these derived objects “superacts”, emphasiz-
ing both their artificial nature and act like structure. We then derive a preference
relation %∗ on superacts through a natural association of superacts with menus.
Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that this derived relation inherits a set of prop-
erties once the DM’s preferences % onM satisfies axioms WO, VA, WSI, MON,
MC and UB.
In particular, %∗ satisfies all the properties of a variational preference (Mac-
cheroni et al., 2006), except that %∗ is ambiguity loving. Adapting Maccheroni
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et al. (2006),%∗ can then be represented by a convex niveloid I, that moreover sat-
isfies additional properties derived from the additional structure on%∗ (Lemma
2). Lemma 3 identifies the cost function c and demonstrates its properties from
the additional structure on the niveloid I. Finally, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are
used to establish the desired representation. The converse of the result is ob-
tained in a similar fashion as Lemmata 1–3 are characterization results. Details
of the proof are given in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 shows that the axioms in Section 1.2 characterize a DM who acts
as if she anticipates choosing joint distributions over S × Σ, subject to the cost
of attending to information contained in distributions. The value of a joint dis-
tribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) comes only from the DM’s ability to use the information
contained in the distribution to make better ex-post choices in the menu.
In particular, since c is focused on pi (property (i) of an information cost func-
tion), the optimization over joint distributions is constrained so that the DM
uses her prior pi to form ex-ante expectations. This constraint ensures that the
DM’s prior evaluations are the same for each menu, and varying attention can
only improve the choices made ex-post (not the ex-ante value of a particular plan
for choices). If the DM was unable to attend to any information about states
before choosing from menus, the best she could do is to choose the best act ac-
cording to her a priori information (captured through pi). If, instead, the DM
could attend to sufficient information to identify the true state in every case,
she could choose the best act in each state in any given menu. However, the
DM modeled via (1.6) lies between these extremes (see Observation 1), and op-
timally varies attention according to the menus under consideration due to the
cost of information c. For a DM with variable attention, the value of a menu
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M therefore lies somewhere between the expected utility value of the a priori
optimal act and the ex-post optimal act in M.











Eu[ f (s)] d pi . (1.7)
Although we do not characterize specific functional forms for information
cost functions, the following proposition establishes that information costs can
be measured by the mutual information function, the measure of information
proposed by Sims (1998, 2003) for rational inattention modeling.
Proposition 1 Let θ ∈ [0,∞], u : Z → R be unbounded, pi ∈ ∆(S), and suppose that
















d pS(s) − θMI(p)
}
s.t. pS = pi , (1.8)
then V∗ is a utility function with variable attention onM.
1.3.4 A utility representation for constrained attention
In the background of the utility representation for variable attention is the idea
that attention is a scarce resource. A special case corresponds to a purely “phys-
ical” constraint on attention. Recalling the restaurant choice example, suppose
that the DM does not have access to the Internet, newspapers or magazines, but
that she could instead call a friend to get a recommendation. If calling a friend
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has no opportunity cost but she does not have time to call more than one friend,
she faces a purely “physical” attention allocation problem.
We obtain a special case of the utility representation for variable attention
by strengthening the WSI axiom, which in turn represents a further restriction
on the types of preference reversals permitted by VA. Suppose, for example,
that the DM has one Italian and one Japanese friend. The restaurant options
being considered are Italian and Japanese a` la carte restaurants, and a table d’hoˆte
restaurant. With the physical constraint that she can call only one of her two
friends, the optimal allocation of attention for a randomization over the Italian
and table d’hoˆte restaurants is not affected by the weight put on the Italian restau-
rant. No matter how unlikely it is that the Italian restaurant will be drawn, the
DM should call her Italian friend for a recommendation. Likewise, in the ran-
domization over the Japanese and table d’hoˆte restaurants, the DM should call
her Japanese friend no matter what weight the objective randomization puts
on the a` la carte option. More generally, we argue that under purely “physi-
cal” constraints on attention, mixtures with singleton menus should not affect
the attention allocation problem. The following axiom therefore posits that they
should not lead to preference reversals.
Axiom 7 (Singleton Independence (SI)) Given M,N ∈ M, f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1),
then
αM + (1 − α){ f } % αN + (1 − α){ f } ⇔ M % N .
As the intuition behind the restaurant choice example suggests, strengthen-
ing WSI to SI leads to an as if model of an attention allocation problem in which
the DM does not face costs of attention, but instead optimizes over joint distri-
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butions in a constraint set. The following definition formalizes the properties
which the resulting constraint set satisfies.
Definition 2 (Information Constraint Set) Given a prior pi ∈ ∆(S), we say that a
compact convex set Π ⊂ ∆(S × Σ) is an information constraint set (relative to pi) if
Π satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Focused on prior pi: pS , pi implies p < Π,
(ii) Inclusive of null information: {p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ)|pS = pi} ⊂ Π,
(iii) Data processing monotonicity: p ∈ Π and p % q implies q ∈ Π.
Properties (i)-(iii) of an information constraint set are the natural counter-
parts of properties (i)-(iii) of an information cost function, and have the same
interpretation in the current setting. The focus on pi restricts the DM to use the
same prior to form all ex-ante expectations. The inclusion of null information im-
plies that an information constraint set is non-empty, because it contains joint
distributions under which S and Σ are independent. Data processing mono-
tonicity implies that an information constraint set that contains p also contains
any distributions q that contain less information than p. The following rep-
resentation result characterizes when attention of a preference relation can be
captured through an information constraint set.
Theorem 2 Let % be a binary relation onM. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) % is a preference relation with variable attention that satisfies the SI axiom.
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(ii) There exists a prior pi ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and an
information constraint set Π ⊂ ∆(S×Σ) (relative to pi), such that for all M,N ∈ M,
M % N ⇔ V˜(M) ≥ V˜(N) , (1.9)
















d pi(s) . (1.10)
Moreover, if (pi1, u1,Π1) and (pi2, u2,Π2) represent the same preference relation % onM,
then pi1 = pi2, Π1 = Π2, and u1 ≈ u2.
It is clear that WSI is redundant in the presence of SI. Hence, in view of
Theorem (2), we call a binary relation % on M satisfying axioms WO, VA, SI,
MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with constrained attention; and we call
the representation functional in (1.10) a (pi, u,Π)-utility representation with con-
strained attention on M. Proposition 2 confirms that the information constraint
set can again be defined in terms of the mutual information function. The re-
sulting model is the finite Shannon capacity functional form first proposed by
Sims (1998) for rational inattention modeling.
Proposition 2 Let κ ∈ [0,∞], u : Z → R unbounded, pi ∈ ∆(S), and suppose that for

















s.t. pS = pi and MI(p) ≤ κ, (1.11)
then V˜∗ is a utility function with constrained attention onM.
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1.3.5 Fixed attention and subjective learning
A recent literature studies models of subjective learning (Dillinberger and Sad-
owski, 2011; Takeoka, 2005; Lleras, 2010) in similar decision environments to the
one outlined in Section 1.2. Subjective learning models study a DM who antici-
pates receiving subjective information – i.e, information not observable to a de-
cision theorist – before making ex-post choices, and try to capture the behavioral
implications of expected information gain. There are noticeable intersections
with our decision theoretic model of scarce attention, which we now formalize.
Unlike an agent with scarce attention, the DM in the subjective learning lit-
erature is a passive recipient of information, and is neither able to exert more (or
less) effort to change her knowledge about states, nor able to actively tailor the
information she attends to for the particular menu under consideration. In the
context of the restaurant choice example, one could think of a DM who antici-
pates meeting a particular colleague on the way to a restaurant, anticipates get-
ting information from the colleague that could help in choosing a dish, but does
not anticipate being able to actively influence the information that the colleague
will reveal to her. In some sense, the DM anticipates learning information that a
decision theorist can not observe, but the DM does not in fact face any attention
allocation problem.
To clarify the relation between our model of scarce attention and models of
subjective learning formally, we provide a further special case of the represen-
tations in Theorems 1 and 2.10 We obtain a model of passive learning simply by
10Axiomatically, our characterization of subjective learning adapts the results in Dillinberger
and Sadowski (2011) Takeoka (2005, also closely related to) to our modified setting, but our
representation of expected information in terms of a joint distribution on a product space of
states with latent signals is distinct (and follows a different method of proof).
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strengthening the VA axiom.
Our normative justification for VA was based on the idea that the DM would
ideally prefer the resolution of objective randomization before she has actively
allocated attention among competing information sources, as late resolution
could complicate the attention allocation problem. However, if the DM antic-
ipates being a passive recipient of information (i.e., does not believe that she
will be able to actively vary the information that she can attend to), then there is
no reason to posit that she might favor early resolution of objective uncertainty
(at least not, from the informational viewpoint that justified VA). As such, the
following fixed attention axiom states that a DM indifferent between two menus
will also be indifferent to any randomization over the menus.
Axiom 8 (Fixed Attention (FA)) Given M,N ∈ M, then M ∼ N implies M ∼ αM +
(1 − α)N for all α ∈ (0, 1).
A representation for subjective learning is characterized in the context of our
other axioms by strengthening VA to FA.
Theorem 3 Let % be a binary relation onM. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) % is a preference relation with variable attention that satisfies FA.
(ii) There exist a prior pi ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and a joint
distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) with pS = pi, such that for all M,N ∈ M:
M % N ⇔ Vˇ(M) ≥ Vˇ(N) , (1.12)
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d pi(s) . (1.13)
Moreover, if (pi1, u1, p1) and (pi2, u2, p2) represent the same preference relation % onM,
then pi1 = pi2, u1 ≈ u2, and p1 ' p2.
In view of Theorem (3), we call a binary relation % onM satisfying axioms
WO, FA, WSI, MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with fixed attention; and
we call the representation functional in (1.13) a (pi, u, p)-utility function with fixed
attention onM.
The fixed attention model in general allows for a DM to be inattentive
to some available information, but the model differs from the variable and
constrained attention models by placing further restrictions on the type of
(in)attention that the DM can exhibit. The DM now acts as if she anticipates at-
tending to certain information about states before she will choose from menus,
but receives this information passively (i.e., is not able to optimize information
gain with respect to the particular menu under consideration). It seems clear to
us that VA is normatively more compelling than FA, but as a descriptive model,
fixed attention provides a behavioral model of subjective learning that identifies
the fixed constraint on anticipated information gain from choice data.
The uniqueness properties of the joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) is crucial
for the behavioral interpretation of the representation of preferences with fixed
attention. The joint distribution used by the DM to choose from and eval-
uate menus in a utility function with fixed attention is distinguished by the
prior pi over the state space, and the informational content which signals con-
vey about realized states ex-post. As Theorem 3 demonstrates, both are unique.
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As such, Theorem 3 characterizes when the information that a DM expects to
receive about realized states (without any ability to actively tailor the informa-
tion attended to) can be uniquely identified from choice behavior in our setting;
namely, exactly when the DM has preferences with fixed attention.
1.4 Comparative Attention
In this Section, we formalize a notion of comparative attention. We first re-
quire some notation. Let P denote the set of all preference relations onM with
variable attention.11 For any %∈ P, denote the set of preferences with variable
attention that coincide with % on singleton menus by P(%) = { %′∈ P : { f } %′ {g}
iff { f } % {g} for all f , g ∈ F }.
Observation 2 Let %1,%2 ∈ P be represented by (u1, pi1, c1) and (u2, pi2, c2), respec-
tively. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) %1,%2 ∈ P(%) for some % ∈ P.
(ii) u1 ≈ u2 and pi1 = pi2.
For two DMs with variable attention, different preferences over menus can
arise due to different tastes for prizes (u), different priors (pi), or different costs
of information (c). Observation 2 demonstrates that if their preferences on sin-
gleton menus coincide, their tastes and priors also coincide. We then seek a
behavioral criterion to relate their information costs, and thereby to establish
11Formally, P := {%⊂ M×M :% satisfies WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and U}.
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observational implications of the (in)attention exhibited by preferences.12
To motivate, consider two DMs, Ann and Bob, who reveal the same pref-
erences over table d’hoˆte restaurants. Moreover, suppose that whenever Ann
prefers an a` la carte restaurant over a specific table d’hoˆte restaurant, Bob reveals
the same preference. We would like to infer from their preferences over table
d’hoˆte restaurants that Ann and Bob have similar tastes for dishes, and from
Bob’s greater willingness to dine at a` la carte restaurants that he expects to be
able to make more informed choices from any menu (i.e., that Bob is more at-
tentive to information than Ann). Our comparative notion of (in)attention for-
malizes this idea.
Definition 3 (More Attentive) If%1,%2 ∈ P, we say that%2 is more attentive than
%1 if, for all M ∈ M and f ∈ F ,
M %1 { f } ⇒ M %2 { f } . (1.14)
Proposition 3 Let %1,%2 ∈ P be represented by (pi1, u1, c1) and (pi2, u2, c2), respec-
tively. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) %2 is more attentive than %1.
(ii) pi1 = pi2, u1 ≈ u2, and c1 ≥ c2 (when u1 = u2).
Proposition 3 confirms that the behavioral criterion for attentiveness in Def-
inition 3 is characterized in terms of intuitive comparative statics on the costs
of information. In particular, if %1 and %2 are represented by (pi1, u1, θ1) and
12Our behavioral criterion for (in)attention are similar in spirit to the comparative notion of
ambiguity aversion proposed in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), but adapted to a different
setting.
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(pi2, u2, θ2), respectively, as in the representation of Proposition 1, then%2 is more
attentive than %1 if and only if pi1 = pi2, u1 ≈ u2, and θ1 ≥ θ2 (when u1 = u2). The
same behavioral criterion for (in)attention allows for equally intuitive compar-
ative statics in the constrained and fixed attention models.
Corollary 1 Let %1,%2 ∈ P be preference relations with constrained [fixed ] attention
associated with information consraint sets [fixed information points ], Π1 [p1] and
Π2 [p2], respectively. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) %2 is more attentive than %1.
(ii) %1,%2 ∈ P(%) for some % ∈ P, and Π1 ⊂ Π2 [p2 % p1 ].
In particular, if %1 and %2 onM are represented by (pi1, u1, κ1) and (pi2, u2, κ2)
as in the representation of Proposition 2, respectively, then %2 is more attentive
than %1 if and only if pi1 = pi2, u1 ≈ u2, and κ1 ≤ κ2.
Based on the comparative notion of (in)attention in Definition 3, we can also
define absolute notions of (in)attention to describe, respectively, the behavior
of most and least attentive DMs. To this end, we say that a preference relation
% ∈ P is totally attentive if it is more attentive than every %′ ∈ P(%); and we say
that % is totally inattentive if every %′ ∈ P(%) is more attentive than %. Formally,
these notions of absolute (in)attention lead us to the following definition.
Definition 4 (Totally (In)Attentive) A preference relation % ∈ P is:
(i) totally attentive if, for all %′ ∈ P(%),
M %′ { f } ⇒ M % { f } for all M ∈ M and f ∈ F . (1.15)
30
(ii) totally inattentive if, for all %′ ∈ P(%),
M % { f } ⇒ M %′ { f } for all M ∈ M and f ∈ F . (1.16)
Intuitively, in each state of the world, a totally attentive DM is able to observe
the true state without costs (i.e., has unlimited attention resources). A totally
inattentive DM meanwhile, is not able to attend to any information after the
realization of states, and can therefore make ex-post choices based only on her a
priori information. These two models represent extremes in terms of the ability
to attend to information about states, but both clearly exhibit fixed attention as,
for quite different reasons, neither faces any trade-offs in attention allocation. In
the following Propositions we characterize both attention extremes in terms of
two additional behavioral axioms.
Axiom 9 (Strong Monotonicity (SMON)) Given M,N ∈ M such that for all g ∈ N
and s ∈ S there exists f ∈ M satisfying { f (s)} % {g(s)}, then M % N.
Axiom 10 (Null Attention (NA)) Given M,N ∈ M, M % N implies M ∼ M ∪ N.
Both SMON and NA can be viewed as monotonicity conditions on prefer-
ences. SMON is stronger than MON, as for all g ∈ N if there exists an f ∈ M
that is preferred to g in all states, then the premise of SMON is clearly satisfied.
It is also easily observed that NA implies MON when combined with the usual
monotonicity condition on singleton menus (see p. 9).
To state characterization results for preferences that satisfy SMON or NA,
we require some additional notation. For any pi ∈ ∆(S), we denote by ∆pi(S ×
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Σ) := {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) : pS = pi} the set of all joint distributions on S × Σ with S-
marginal pi, and we denote by ∆¯pi :=
{
p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ) : pS = pi
}
the set of all product
distributions on S×Σ with S-marginal pi. Finally, for any p ∈ ∆(S×Σ), we denote
by Λ(p) = {q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) : p % q} the set of all joint distributions on S × Σ for
which p is sufficient.
Proposition 4 Let % ∈ P be represented by the triple (pi, u, c). Then the following
statements are equivalent:





max f∈M Eu[ f (s)]
)
dpi(s) for all M ∈ M.
(iii) c(p) =

0 if p ∈ ∆pi(S × Σ)
∞ otherwise
(iv) % is represented by the triple (pi, u,Π) with Π = ∆pi(S × Σ).
(v) % is represented by the triple (pi, u, p) with Λ(p) = ∆pi(S × Σ).
(vi) % is totally attentive.
Proposition 4 characterizes total attention in terms of SMON; our final result
gives the characterization for preferences that are totally inattentive in terms of
NA.
Proposition 5 Let%∈ P be represented by the triple (pi, u, c). Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) % satisfies NA.
(ii) V(M) = max f∈M
∫




0 if p ∈ ∆¯pi(S × Σ)
∞ otherwise
(iv) % is represented by the triple (pi, u,Π) with Π = ∆¯pi(S × Σ).
(v) % is represented by the triple (pi, u, p) with Λ(p) = ∆¯pi(S × Σ).
(vi) % is totally inattentive.
1.5 Discussion of Related Literature
Part of the motivation for our analysis comes from the many applications of
Sims’ rational inattention model (see, e.g., Wiederholt, 2010; Veldkamp, 2011, for
a review and references). Mutual information is the standard information mea-
sure used in this literature. Although we do not characterize specific functional
forms of information cost functions and constraint sets, Propositions 1 and 2
demonstrate that the most commonly used objective functions in the rational
inattention literature are consistent with the utility functionals we axiomatize.
Our results therefore complement the literature applying rational inattention
models in macroeconomics and finance by providing behavioral foundations
that help to clarify their observational content.
In addition, several strands of the decision theory literature inform our ap-
proach. The axioms that we use to characterize decision making with scarce
attention are closely related to axioms commonly found in the literature on am-
biguity aversion on Anscombe-Aumann choice domains, although the interpre-
tation in a menu choice setting is necessarily quite different. For example, the
proof for Theorem 1 clearly relates the variable attention model to the varia-
tional preferences introduced in Maccheroni et al. (2006), a model that gener-
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alizes maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) in a similar way
as variable attention generalizes constrained attention. Maccheroni et al. (2006)
offer a game-against-nature interpretation for the variational utility representa-
tion, in which the DM acts as if she faces a malevolent nature that, at a cost,
chooses distributions over the state space against her. Although our models of
scarce attention have related axiomatic foundations, the interpretation offered
is quite different. In our models, it is the DM who chooses distributions and
faces subjective costs specifically from attending to information. The DM is oth-
erwise a subjective expected utility maximizer – the epitome of a Bayesian DM
– and deviations from the “standard” rational expectations model come only
from limitations on resources for information processing.
It is important for our information-theoretic interpretations that we identify
more behavioral primitives and properties of the cost function than Maccheroni
et al. (2006), and we are able to do so by exploiting our richer menu choice do-
main. Menu choice problems were first proposed by Kreps (1979) to study pref-
erence for flexibility. An influential paper in the subsequent literature is Dekel
et al. (2001), who use menus over objective lotteries on a set of prizes to charac-
terize a subjective state space representation. In our domain on menus of acts,
the state space is a primitive but the signal space – which is derived from pref-
erences – could be viewed as subjective. However, the interpretation is quite
different. The meaning of the state space in the variable attention model comes
from the joint distribution chosen by the DM, and depends only on the proba-
bilities of different signals not their identity (by property (iii) of an information
cost function). As in the rational inattention approach more generally, it is not
necessary to try and interpret the signal space “independently” of some beliefs
over it, as Dekel et al. (2001) do in their subjective state space model. The only
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probability measure that needs to be interpreted independently is the marginal
on the primitive state space S, and the uniqueness of pi in our representation
results assures that we are able to do so.
There are also related menu choice models in which DMs face subjective
costs from, inter alia, self-control problems (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001)
or thinking aversion (Ortoleva, 2012). A driving assumption in many of these
models is that DMs may sometimes strictly prefer a subset of a menu (unlike in
Kreps, 1979). Ortoleva (2012), for example, studies a DM who incurs costs from
thinking about the content of a menu, and may therefore prefer a smaller menu
to a larger one that contains it. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) also consider a DM
who reveals potentially limited attention about items in a menu. Thinking aver-
sion and the revealed inattention in Masatlioglu et al. (2012) differ, however,
from the type of inattention we study because a DM with variable attention
fully understands the content of each menu, and rather faces costs from pro-
cessing information about an external state space that is independent of menus.
A strict preference for subsets therefore does not make sense in our setting –
or, at least, does not follow from the type of inattention we are interested in –
and it is straightforward to verify that our monotonicity axiom contradicts such
preference patterns.
The closest work to ours in the menu choice literature is Ergin and Sarver
(2010), who extend on Dekel et al. (2001) to analyze a decision model with costly
contemplation.13 In the costly contemplation model, the DM has uncertainty
13After completing our manuscript, we became aware of independent, similar contributions
by Ellis (2012), and (via private communications) by Denti (2012) and de Oliveira (2012). Ellis
(2012) also presents a decision model motivated by rational inattention, but in terms of decision
environment, axioms and representation his approach is very different to ours. The works of
Denti (2012) and de Oliveira (2012) seem close to ours and both contain a representation for
what we call preferences with variable attention in this paper. However, their methods of proof
differ substantially from ours, and we have seen only an early draft of their papers, that do not
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about future tastes (e.g., parameters of risk-aversion) and, at a subjective cost,
can exert contemplation to better understand her tastes before choosing from
the menu. The domain of preferences in their analysis is menus of objective lot-
teries, and therefore differs from ours. But the axioms that characterize costly
contemplation behaviorally are very similar to ours. In particular, our variable
attention axiom is the natural counterpart of their contemplation aversion ax-
iom in a richer choice setting. However, the translation of their axioms into a
menu-of-acts domain leads to new insights. A DM with variable attention un-
derstands her tastes, and uncertainty about external states remains only due
to limitations on her information processing. Our representation is therefore
closer to applied work in information economics, as testified by the large pre-
existing literature in which rational inattention has been successfully used to
explain diverse phenomena from price stickiness (e.g., Mackowiak and Wieder-
holt, 2009) and business cycle fluctuations (e.g., Mackowiak and Wiederholt,
2010), to the home-bias in international portfolio decisions (e.g., Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp, 2009).
Finally, the decision models we study could be placed in the context of
the large literature on bounded rationality more generally, although that label
seems misleading to us. To be sure, rational inattention is a deviation from the
rational expectations framework, where an agent is assumed to internalize all
publicly available information without effort. But the manner in which informa-
tion processing is treated under rational expectations seem like an unreasonably
high bar to place on rationality. As cognitive psychologists have long recog-
nized, attention can be viewed as a scarce resource, and optimal allocation of
attention could then be viewed a classic resource allocation problem. A central
represent alternative forms of (in)attention, as in our fixed attention.
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contribution of Sims (1998, 2003) was to draw this resource allocation problem
to the attention of the economic profession, and propose a tractable framework
to integrate attention allocation into larger economic models. A growing litera-
ture attests to the value of his proposed approach, but we believe that the study
of inattention also falls in the purview of decision theory as the allocation of at-
tention – unlike many other valuable resources – often occurs in private, behind
closed doors, rather than in markets or other public forums. Firmly in the spirit
of Sims’ approach, we nevertheless regard attention as the allocation of a scarce
resource by an optimizing agent, and therefore hold that as a model of behavior
our findings affirm that rational inattention has both descriptive and normative
appeal.
1.6 Conclusion
The objective functions used in economic models are chosen to capture pertinent
behavioral attributes of agents in a tractable way. Rational inattention is a case
in point. The assumption that an agent chooses a joint distribution over states
and signals omits many details of attention and information processing, but has
proven tractable enough to successfully embed attention allocation problems in
larger economic models. In order to remain empirically founded it is also im-
portant, however, to understand what the falsifiable implications of a decision
rule are. The objects of choice in the rational inattention approach (i.e., joint
distributions) make this task appear challenging.
In this paper, we allay concerns over the observational foundations of ratio-
nal inattention models by identifying a choice domain and a set of falsifiable
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axioms that characterize rationally inattentive behavior. A DM who obeys our
axioms acts as if she anticipates choosing joint distributions over states and sig-
nals subject to costs of information, as in much of the applied literature on ratio-
nal inattention. The attention allocation problem proposed by Sims (1998, 2003)
therefore attains the same standing in our framework as the prior in the clas-
sic subjective expected utility model of Savage (1954), itself not observable but
inferable from observable choice data.
As a large literature attests, rational inattention appears to have much to
offer for economic research in the age of information. By clarifying some of the
decision theoretic underpinnings of rational inattention, our results therefore
add to a deeper understanding of an important approach to model limitations
on people’s ability to attend to the abundance of available information.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce some notation and definitions extending on Maccheroni et al.
(2006).
For any finite set S and countably infinite set Σ, let B0(S × Σ) be the set of all
simple functions ϕ : S × Σ → R, and B(S × Σ) its supnorm closure consisting of
all bounded functions ψ : S×Σ→ R. B0(S×Σ,T ) denotes the set of all functions
in B0(S × Σ) taking values in the interval T ⊂ R. Endowed with the supnorm,
B0(S× Σ) is a normed vector space and its norm dual ba(S× Σ) is endowed with
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the total variation norm. As a consequence of duality, the space of all probability
measures ∆(S × Σ) can be endowed with the weak* topology where a net {pd}d∈D
converges to p if pd(E) → p(E) for all E ∈ 2S×Σ (see, e.g., the opening remarks in
the Appendix of Maccheroni et al., 2006).
For ϕ, ψ ∈ B(S×Σ), we write ϕ ≥ ψ if ϕ(s, σ) ≥ ψ(s, σ) for all (s, σ) ∈ S×Σ, and
we write ϕ ≥Σ ψ if for all σ ∈ Σ there exists σ′ ∈ Σ such that ϕ(s, σ′) ≥ ψ(s, σ) for
all s ∈ S. Let Φ be any non-empty, convex collection of elements of B(S × Σ), Φc
the subset of constant functions in Φ, and ΦS the subset of functions in Φ that
are measurable with respect to the algebra 2S × Σ. Given a functional I : Φ→ R,
we say that I is:
(i) normalized if I(k1S×Σ) = k for all k1S×Σ ∈ Φc;
(ii) monotonic if ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and ϕ ≥ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ);
(iii) Σ-monotonic if ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and ϕ ≥Σ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ);
(iv) singleton-additive if I(αϕ+ (1−α)ψ) = I(αϕ) + (1−α)I(ψ) for all ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ ΦS
and α ∈ [0, 1] such that αϕ ∈ Φ;
(v) convex if I(αϕ+ (1−α)ψ) ≤ αI(ϕ)+ (1−α)I(ψ) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and all α ∈ [0, 1]
such that αϕ + (1 − α)ψ ∈ Φ;
(vi) a niveloid if I(ϕ) − I(ψ) ≤ sup(ϕ − ψ) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ.
Remark 1 Let I¯ : −Φ → R be defined by I¯(ϕ) := −I(−ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ −Φ. Then I¯ is
normalized iff I is normalized; I¯ is monotonic iff I is monotonic; I¯ is Σ-monotonic iff I
is Σ-monotonic; I¯ is singleton-additive iff I is singleton-additive; I¯ is a niveloid iff I is a
niveloid; I¯ is concave iff I is convex.
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1.7.2 “Superacts”
Let K0 denote the set of all simple functions K : S × Σ → ∆(Z). We refer to
elements of K0 as superacts. Denote by Kc the set of all Kp ∈ K0 – called constant
superacts – for which there exists a p ∈ ∆(Z) such that Kp(s, σ) = p for all (s, σ) ∈
S × Σ. Denote by KS the set of all K f ∈ K0 – called singleton superacts – for which
there exists an act f ∈ F such that K f (., σ) = f for all σ ∈ Σ. With some abuse of
notation, we denote by K(s, σ) ∈ K0 the super act that takes value K(s, σ) ∈ ∆(Z)
for all (s′, σ′) ∈ S×Σ. For all K,K′ ∈ K0 and α ∈ [0, 1], αK+(1−α)K′ is the superact
K¯ ∈ K0 defined by K¯(s, σ) := αK(s, σ) + (1 − α)K′(s, σ) for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ. Note
that with respect to this mixture operation, the set K0 is a mixture space.
In the sequel, we will refer to the following properties of a binary relation
%? on K0. To this end, associate %? in the usual sense, with its symmetric and
asymmetric parts denoted ∼? and ?, respectively.
• Weak Order (WO*): (i) If K,K′ ∈ K0, then either K %? K′ or K′ %? K. (ii) If
K,K′,K′′ ∈ K0, K %? K′ and K′ %? K′′, then K %? K′′.
• Ambiguity Affection (AA*): If K,K′ ∈ K0, K ∼? K′ and α ∈ (0, 1), then K %?
αK + (1 − α)K′.
• Weak Constant-Singleton Independence (WCSI*): If K,K′ ∈ K0, Kp,Kq ∈ Kc
and α ∈ (0, 1), then
αK + (1 − α)Kp %? αK′ + (1 − α)Kp ⇔ αK + (1 − α)Kq %? αK′ + (1 − α)Kq .
• Weak Singleton Independence (WSI*): If K,K′ ∈ K0, K f ,Kg ∈ KS and α ∈ (0, 1),
then
αK + (1 − α)K f %? αK′ + (1 − α)K f ⇔ αK + (1 − α)Kg %? αK′ + (1 − α)Kg .
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• Singleton Independence (SI*): If K,K′ ∈ K0, K f ∈ KS and α ∈ (0, 1), then
K %? K′ ⇔ αK + (1 − α)K f %? αK′ + (1 − α)K f .
• Monotonicity (MON*): If K,K′ ∈ K0 such that K(s, σ) %? K′(s, σ) for all
(s, σ) ∈ S × Σ, then K %? K′.
• Σ-Monotonicity (ΣMON*): If K,K′ ∈ K0 such that for all σ ∈ Σ, there exists
some σ′ ∈ Σ with K(s, σ′) %? K′(s, σ) for all s ∈ S, then K %? K′.
• Mixture-Continuity (MC*): For all K f ,Kg ∈ KS and K ∈ K0, the sets {α ∈
[0, 1] | αK f + (1 − α)Kg %? K} and {α ∈ [0, 1] | K %? αK f + (1 − α)Kg} are
closed.
• Unboundedness (UB*): There exist Kp,Kq ∈ Kc with Kp ? Kq such that for
all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists Kr ∈ Kc satisfying either αKr + (1 − α)Kq ? Kp or
Kq ? αKr + (1 − α)Kp.
Properties of a derived relation on superacts
The focus of this Section is a Lemma that characterizes properties of a derived
binary relation on K0. Before stating the result, we require some additional
notation and definitions.
Let {σ1, σ2, ...} be an enumeration of the set Σ, and for any M = { f1, ..., fTM } ∈
M, define KM ∈ K0 as follows:
KM(., σ j) =

f j if j ≤ TM
f1 if j > TM
.
In all of the following, the specific enumerations chosen for M and Σ do not
matter.
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Define the operator m : K0 →M as follows: For all K ∈ K0 let
m(K) =
{
f ∈ F | f = K(., σ) for some σ ∈ Σ} . (1.17)
Remark 2 Let K,K′ ∈ K0, M ∈ M, f ∈ F , K f ∈ KS , α ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
(i) m(K) ∈ M, as for each σ ∈ Σ K(., σ) ∈ F and the range of K is finite.
(ii) m(KM) = M and m(K f ) = { f }.
(iii) m(αK + (1 − α)K′) ⊂ αm(K) + (1 − α)m(K′).
(iv) m(αK + (1 − α)K f ) = αm(K) + (1 − α){ f }.
Let % be a given binary relation on M. Define a binary relation %∗ on K0
using the operator m by way of the following definition: For all K,K′ ∈ K0,
K %∗ K′ :⇔ m(K) % m(K′) . (1.18)
The following Lemma characterizes some properties that%∗ can inherit from
%.
Lemma 1 Let% be a binary relation onM and define%∗ onK0 by way of (1.18). Then
% satisfies WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB axioms if and only if %∗ satisfies the
WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB* properties. Moreover, % satisfies SI if and
only if %∗ satisfies SI*.
Proof. Let % be a binary relation onM and let %∗ be defined as in (1.18).
Suppose % satisfies the WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC, and UB axioms, then we
show that %∗ satsfies WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and UB*.
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(WO*): Let K,K′ ∈ K0, then by WO, either m(K) % m(K′) or m(K′) % m(K),
hence %∗ is complete. Let K,K′,K′′ ∈ K0, and suppose that K %∗ K′ and K′ %∗
K′′. Then m(K) % m(K′) and m(K′) % m(K′′), and so by WO it follows that
m(K) % m(K′′) so that %∗ is transitive. Hence %∗ is a weak order.
(AA*): Let K,K′ ∈ K0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. By MON and Remark 2 it follows that
αm(K) + (1−α)m(K′) % m(αK + (1−α)K′). Now if K ∼∗ K′ then m(K) ∼ m(K′) and
by VA m(K) % αm(K)+(1−α)m(K′) % m(αK+(1−α)K′), and so K %∗ αK+(1−α)K′.
Hence %∗ satisfies AA*.
(WSI*): Let K,K′ ∈ K0, K f ,Kg ∈ KS and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then by WSI and Remark
2,
m(αK + (1 − α)K f ) = αm(K) + (1 − α){ f }
% αm(K′) + (1 − α){ f }
= m(αK′ + (1 − α)K f )
⇔ m(αK + (1 − α)Kg) = αm(K) + (1 − α){g}
% αm(K′) + (1 − α){g}
= m(αK′ + (1 − α)Kg) ,
and so αK + (1 − α)K f %∗ αK′ + (1 − α)K f iff αK + (1 − α)Kg %∗ αK′ + (1 − α)Kg.
Hence, %∗ satisfies WSI*.
(ΣMON*): Let K,K′ ∈ K0, and suppose that for all σ ∈ Σ there exists σ′ ∈ Σ
such that K(s, σ′) %∗ K′(s, σ) for all s ∈ S. Let g ∈ m(K′). Then there exists
some σ ∈ Σ such that g = K′(., σ) and so there exists some σ′ ∈ Σ such that
K(s, σ′) %∗ K′(s, σ) for all s ∈ S. Let f = K(s, σ′). Then f ∈ m(K) such that
f (s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S. By MON it follows that m(K) % m(K′) and so%∗ satisfies
ΣMON*. Moreover, since ΣMON* implies MON*, %∗ also satisfies MON*.
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(MC*): Let K f ,Kg ∈ KS and K ∈ K0. Then by Remark 2,{
α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣αK f + (1 − α)Kg %∗ K} = {α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣m(αK f + (1 − α)Kg) % m(K)}(1.19)
=
{
α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣α{ f } + (1 − α){g} % m(K)} ,(1.20)
and
{
α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣K %∗ αK f + (1 − α)Kg} = {α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣m(K) % m(αK f + (1 − α)Kg)}(1.21)
=
{
α ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣m(K) % α{ f } + (1 − α){g}} .(1.22)
Since % satisfies MC all of the above sets are closed, and it follows that %∗ satis-
fies MC*.
(UB*): By UB, there exists p,q ∈ ∆(Z) with {p}  {q} such that for all α ∈ (0, 1)
there exists r ∈ ∆(Z) satisfying either {q}  α{r}+(1−α){p} or α{r}+(1−α){q}  {p}.
By the natural identification of Kc ⊂ K0 with ∆(Z), %∗ therefore satisfies UB* as
m(Kp) = {p} by Remark 2.
Finally, suppose % satisfies SI.
(SI*): Let K,K′ ∈ K0, f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1). Then by SI and Remark 2, K %∗ K′
iff m(K) % m(K′) iff αm(K) + (1−α){ f } % αm(K′) + (1−α){ f } iff m(αK+ (1−α)K f ) %
m(αK′ + (1 − α)K f ) iff αK + (1 − α)K f %∗ αK′ + (1 − α)K f . Hence, %∗ satisfies SI*.
To show the converse, let %∗ satisfy WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and
UB*.
(WO): Let M,N ∈ M. By WO* and Remark 2, KM %∗ KN or KN %∗ KM, and so
% is complete. Let L,M,N ∈ M such that L % M and M % N. Then KL %∗ KM
and KM %∗ KN , and so by WO*, KL %∗ KN . Hence, % is a weak order.
(VA): Let M = { f1, ..., fTM },N = {g1, ..., gTN } ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1]. Let K ∈ K0 be
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defined as follows:
K(., σ j) =

f1 if j ∈ {nTN + 1 | n ∈ N}
f2 if j ∈ {nTN + 2 | n ∈ N}
...
fTM if j ∈ {nTN + TM | n ∈ N}
.
Let K′ ∈ K0 be defined as follows:
K′(., σ j) =

g1 if j ∈ {nTNTM + k | t ∈ N and k ∈ {1, ...,TM}}
g2 if j ∈ {TM + nTNTM + k | n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, ...,TM}}
g3 if j ∈ {2TM + nTNTM + k | n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, ...,TM}}
...
gTN if j ∈ {(TN − 1)TM + nTNTM + k | n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, ...,TM}}
.
Then m(K) = M, m(K′) = N and m(αK+(1−α)K′) = αM+(1−α)N. Hence, if M ∼ N
then K ∼∗ K′, and so by AA*, K %∗ αK+(1−α)K′. Hence, m(K) % m(αK+(1−α)K′)
and therefore M % αM + (1 − α)N. Hence, % satisfies VA.
(WSI): Let M,N ∈ M, f , g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1). By WSI*,
αKM + (1 − α)K f %∗ αKN + (1 − α)K f
⇔ αKM + (1 − α)Kg %∗ αKN + (1 − α)Kg ,
and so by Remark 2, % satisfies WSI.
(MON): Let M,N ∈ M and suppose that for all g ∈ N there exists f ∈ M such
that { f (s)} % {g(s)} for all s ∈ S. Then for all σ ∈ Σ, there exists some σ′ ∈ Σ such
that KM(., σ′) %∗ KN(., σ). By ΣMON*, KM %∗ KN and so M % N and % satisfies
MON.
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(MC): Let f , g ∈ F and M ∈ M. By Remark 2,{
α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ α{ f } + (1 − α){g} % M} = {α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ Kα f+(1−α)g %∗ KM} (1.23)
=
{
α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ αK f + (1 − α)Kg %∗ KM} ,(1.24)
and{
α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ M % α{ f } + (1 − α){g}} = {α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ KM %∗ Kα f+(1−α)g} (1.25)
=
{
α ∈ [0, 1] ∣∣∣ KM %∗ αK f + (1 − α)Kg} .(1.26)
By MC*, all of the above sets are closed, and so % satisfies MC.
(UB):. By UB* there exists p,q ∈ ∆(Z) with Kp ∗ Kq such that for all α ∈ (0, 1)
there exists r ∈ ∆(Z) satisfying either Kq ∗ αKr+(1−α)Kp or αKr+(1−α)Kq  Kp.
By the natural identification of MC ⊂ M with ∆(Z), % therefore satisfies UB
because m(Kp) = {p} for all p ∈ ∆(Z).
Finally, suppose %∗ satisfies SI*.
(SI): Let M,N ∈ M, f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1). Then by SI*, M % N iff KM %∗ KN iff
αKM + (1 − α)K f %∗ αKN + (1 − α)K f , and so by Remark 2 it follows that M % N
iff αM + (1 − α) f % αN + (1 − α) f . Hence, % satisfies SI.
A representation for the binary relation on superacts
For any function u : Z → R, let cl(u) denote the convex closure of u(Z) := {u ∈
R|u = u(z) for some z ∈ Z}. For any K ∈ K0, we use the notation Eu ◦ K to denote
(s, σ) 7→ Eu[K(s, σ)]. Let Eu ◦ K0 = {Eu ◦ K |K ∈ K0}. Maccheroni et al. (2006,
Lemma 28) establish the following Remark.
Remark 3 Let u : Z → R, then Eu ◦ K0 = B0(S × Σ, cl(u)).
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The following Lemma gives a first representation result for the binary rela-
tion %∗ on superacts.
Lemma 2 Let %∗ be a binary relation on K0. The following two statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) %∗ satisfies WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and UB*.
(ii) There exists an unbounded function u : Z → R and a normalized, Σ-monotonic,
singleton-additive, convex niveloid I : B0(S × Σ, cl(u)) → R, such that for all
K,K′ ∈ K0:
K %∗ K′ ⇔ I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K′) . (1.27)
Moreover, there exists a unique pi ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu ◦ K f ) =
∫
S Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) for
all f ∈ F , and u is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Proof. To show (i) implies (ii), let %∗ satisfy WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*,
and UB*. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1: Existence of u : Z → R and a normalized, Σ-monotonic niveloid I
representing %∗.
For any K ∈ K0, let bK be the %∗-maximal element of the range of K, and wK
be the %∗-minimal element of K. By ΣMON*, bK %∗ K %∗ wK . By MC*, the sets
{α |αbK + (1−α)wK ∗ K} and {α |K ∗ αbK + (1−α)wK} are open, and since [0, 1]
is a connected set there exists an αK ∈ [0, 1] such that αKbK + (1 − αK)wK ∼∗ K.
Hence, every K ∈ K0 has a constant-singleton equivalent pK ∈ Kc, such that
K ∼∗ pK . It then follows exactly as in the proof of Lemma 28 in Maccheroni et al.
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(2006), that there exists a non-constant function u : Z → R and a normalized
niveloid I : B0(S × Σ, cl(u))→ R such that for all K,K′ ∈ K0,
K %∗ K′ ⇔ I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K′) . (1.28)
Moreover, the function u is unique up to positive affine transformations, and by
Lemma 29 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) u is unbounded. In addition, it is easily
verified that ΣMON* implies that I is Σ-monotonic.
Step 2: Convexity of I.
Let α ∈ [0, 1] and ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(S × Σ, cl(u)) such that I(ϕ) = I(ψ). Then there
exist K,K′ ∈ K such that Eu ◦ K = ϕ, Eu ◦ K′ = ψ and so K ∼∗ K′. By AA*,
K %∗ αK + (1 − α)K′ and so
I(ϕ) = I(Eu ◦ K)
≥ I(Eu ◦ (αK + (1 − α)K′))
= I(αEu ◦ K + (1 − α)Eu ◦ K′)
= I(αϕ + (1 − α)ψ) (1.29)
Let I¯ : B0(S × Σ,−cl(u)) → R be defined by I¯(ϕ) = −I(−ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ B0(S ×
Σ,−cl(u)). By Remark 1, I¯ is a normalized niveloid. Also, it is easy to verify that
for any ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(S×Σ,−cl(u)) such that I¯(ϕ) = I¯(ψ) and α ∈ [0, 1], I¯(αϕ+(1−α)ψ) ≥
I¯(ϕ) by (1.29). Thus Lemma 25 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) guarantees that I¯ is
concave, and by Remark 1 I must be convex.
Step 3: Existence of pi ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu ◦ K f ) =
∫
S Eu[ f (s)]dpi(s) for all
f ∈ F .
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Let %′ be a binary relation on F defined by:
f %′ g if K f %∗ Kg , (1.30)
and associate with it the asymmetric part ′ and symmetric part ∼′ in the usual
sense. It is easy to verify that %′ satisfies counterparts of WO*, WSI*, MC* and
UB* (denoted WO’, WSI’, MC’ and UB’), and that it satisfies the property MON’:
If f (s) %′ g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f %′ g.
We now show that%′ also satisfies I’: For all f , g ∈ F , f %′ g iff α f + (1−α)h %
αg + (1 − α)h for all h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1).
Let f , g ∈ F such that f ∼′ g. Suppose for contradiction, without loss of
generality, that there exists some h ∈ F such that (1/2) f +(1/2)h ′ (1/2)g+(1/2)h.
Then, by WSI’, f ′ (1/2)g + (1/2) f and similarly (1/2)g + (1/2) f ′ g, implying
that f ′ g, a contradiction. Therefore, for any h ∈ F , we must have (1/2) f +
(1/2)h ∼′ (1/2)g + (1/2)h. Thus, together with properties WO’, MON’, MC’ and
UB’, all three postulates in Herstein and Milnor (1953) are satisfied, and so by
their Theorems 2 and 3, %′ satisfies I’. It then follows from a standard result
(see, e.g., Fishburn, 1970; Kreps, 1988, pp. 176–177, pp.99–111) that there exist
a unique probability measure pi ∈ ∆(S) and a non-constant function v : Z → R,
unique up to positive affine transformations, such that for all f , g ∈ F ,
f %′ g ⇔
∫
S
Ev[ f (s)] d pi(s) ≥
∫
S
Ev[g(s)] d pi(s) . (1.31)
Since I is normalized, by (1.28), (1.30), (1.31) and the uniqueness properties of
v and u it is without loss of generality to assume v = u (hence, v is also un-
bounded). Thus for all f , g ∈ KS ,
f %′ g ⇔
∫
S
Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) ≥
∫
S
Eu[g(s)] d pi(s) . (1.32)
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Moreover, by (1.28), (1.30) and (1.32),
I
(













Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) . (1.33)
Step 4: Singleton-additivity of I.
To complete the proof that (i) implies (ii) we now show that WSI* also implies
that I is singleton-additive. Since u is unbounded and unique only up to positive
affine transformations, assume w.l.o.g that 0 ∈ int (u(Z)). Now let K ∈ K0,
f ∈ F , and α ∈ [0, 1], and note that Eu[αbK + (1− α)K f (s, σ)] ≥ Eu[αK(s, σ) + (1−
α)K f (s, σ)] ≥ Eu[αwK + (1 − α)K f (s, σ)] for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ. By monotonicity of

















αKwK + (1 − α)K f
])
, (1.34)










αwK + (1 − α) f (s)] d pi(s) .(1.35)











α Eu [p¯] + (1 − α) Eu[ f (s)]
]
d pi(s)
= αEu [p¯] + (1 − α)I
(
Eu ◦ K f
)
, (1.36)
where p¯ := βbK + (1 − β)wK . By (1.28), (1.33), and (1.36), αKp¯ + (1 − α)K f ∼∗ αK +
(1 − α)K f . Let p0 ∈ ∆(Z) such that Eu[p0] = 0, then by WSI*, αKp¯ + (1 − α)Kp0 ∼∗
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αK + (1 − α)Kp0 , and hence
αEu[p¯] = αEu(p¯) + (1 − α)Eu(p0)
= Eu (αp¯ + (1 − α)p0)
= I
(
Eu ◦ (αKp¯ + (1 − α)Kp0) )
= I
(
Eu ◦ (αK + (1 − α)Kp0) )
= I
(




















α Eu ◦ K) + (1 − α)I(Eu ◦ K f ) , (1.38)
and so I is singleton-additive.
Steps 1 - 4 complete the proof that (i) implies (ii), and establish the existence
of pi ∈ ∆(S) by Step 3.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), let u : Z → R be an unbounded function,
and I : B0(S × Σ, cl(u)) → R be a normalized, Σ-monotone, singleton-additive,
convex niveloid that represents %∗ in the sense of (1.28). Lemmas 28 and 29
in Maccheroni et al. (2006) shows that %∗ satisfies WO*, MC*, UB*, ΣMON*,
and WSCI*. Property ΣMON* follows directly from Σ-monotonicity of I, and
property AA* follows directly from convexity of I. It therefore remains to
show that %∗ satisfies WSI*. Let K,K′ ∈ K0, f , g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1) such that
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+ (1 − α)I
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+ (1 − α)I
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αK′ + (1 − α)Kg
) )
⇔ αK + (1 − α)Kg %∗ αK′ + (1 − α)Kg (1.39)
showing that%∗ satisfies WSI*, and also completing the proof that (ii) implies (i).
Since, (i) and (ii) are equivalent, Step 3 in the proof that (i) implies (ii) establishes
the existence of pi ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu ◦ K f ) =
∫
S Eu[ f (s)]dpi(s) for all f ∈ F .
The following Lemma is a central step in identifying the information cost
function in Theorem 1. Here, ∆∗(S × Σ) refers to the set of all finitely additive
probability measures on 2S×Σ, a set which clearly contains ∆(S × Σ).
Lemma 3 Let u : Z → R be an unbounded function with 0 ∈ int cl(u), and I be a
real-valued functional on B0(S × Σ, cl(u)). Then (in view of Remark 3) the following
statements are equivalent.
(i) The functional I is a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton-additive, convex
niveloid.












Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ)
]
d pΣ(σ) − c∗(p)
)
, (1.40)





(Eu ◦ K) d p − I(Eu ◦ K)) ∀p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ) , (1.41)
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is the unique grounded, convex, weak* lower-semicontinuous function satisfying
(1.40) and
(a) c∗(p) = ∞ for all p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ) such that pS , pi for some unique pi ∈ ∆(S).
Moreover, in this case c∗(p) also satisfies the following three properties:
(b) c∗(p) ≥ c∗(q) if p, q ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ) such that p % q.
(c) c∗(p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ) such that pS = pi.
(d) c∗(p) = ∞ for all p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ)\∆(S × Σ).
Proof. Let I¯ : B0(S × Σ,−cl(u)) → R be defined by I¯(Eu ◦ K) := −I(−(Eu ◦ K))
for all (Eu ◦ K) ∈ B0(S × Σ,−cl(u)). By Remark 1, I¯ is a concave and normalized
niveloid. Thus, by Lemma 26 in Maccheroni et al. (2006), I¯ satisfies




(Eu ◦ K) d p + c¯(p)
)
∀(Eu ◦ K) ∈ B0(S × Σ,− cl(u)) ,
(1.42)
where c¯(p) is a non-negative, grounded, convex, and weak* lower semi-
continuous function defined on ∆∗(S × Σ). Since u is an unbounded function,
then again by Lemma 26 in Maccheroni et al. (2006),










( − (Eu ◦ K)) − ∫
S×Σ
− (Eu ◦ K) d p) (1.43)
is the unique non-negative, grounded, convex and weak* lower semi-
continuous function satisfying (1.42).
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Thus, by using the definition of I¯ and (1.42), for all Eu ◦ K ∈ B0(S × Σ, cl(u)),











(Eu ◦ K) d p − c∗(p)
)
, (1.44)
















(Eu ◦ K) d p + I¯( − (Eu ◦ K))) = c¯∗(p) , (1.45)
is the unique non-negative, grounded, convex and weak* lower semi-
continuous function defined on ∆∗(S × Σ) satisfying (1.44).















(Eu ◦ K) d p . (1.46)
Thus by (1.44) and (1.46), we have
I
(
Eu ◦ K) ≤ max
p∈∆∗(S×Σ)
J(m(K), p) − c∗(p) . (1.47)
Let p∗ ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ) such that p∗ ∈ arg maxp∈∆∗(S×Σ) J(m(K), p) − c∗(p) and define a
function K∗ : S × Σ→ R such that




Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ) ∀σ ∈ Σ .
It is clear that K∗ ∈ K0. By (1.44)-(1.46), I(Eu◦K∗) = J(m(K), p∗) − c∗(p∗), and so by
(1.47), I(Eu◦K) ≤ I(Eu◦K∗). Moreover, by definition of K∗, (Eu◦K) ≥Σ (Eu◦K∗),
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and so by Σ-monotonicity of I, we must have I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K∗), implying
that
I(Eu ◦ K) = max
p∈∆∗(S×Σ)










Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ)
]
d pΣ(σ) − c∗(p) .(1.48)
Next, we verify the properties (a) – (d) of the function c∗. Note that since I :
B0(S×Σ, cl(u))→ R is a normalized niveloid which is Σ-monotone and singleton-
additive, by Lemma 2 there exists a unique pi ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu ◦ K f ) =∫
S Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) for all acts f ∈ F .
First consider the case of u unbounded above and let p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ) such that
pS , pi. Then there exists s ∈ S such that pS(s) > pi(s). For such an s ∈ S, let
K¯S := {K f ∈ KS : Eu[ f (s)] = a for all s′ ∈ S\{s}} for some fixed a ∈ cl(u). Then by
(1.45) and the fact that I(Eu ◦ K f ) =
∫
S

















Eu[ f (s)] d pS(s) −
∫
S




pS(s) − pi(s)) sup
p∈∆(Z)
(
Eu[p] − a) = ∞ . (1.49)
A similar argument shows that when u is unbounded below, c∗(p) = ∞, and so
we conclude that c∗(p) satisfies property (a).
To show that c∗ satisfies property (b), let p, q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such that p % q. Let
K ∈ K0 and define K p ∈ K0 such that for all σ ∈ Σ,




Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ) (1.50)
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Then it is clear that ∫
S×Σ
(Eu ◦ K) d q ≤
∫
S×Σ
(Eu ◦ K p) d p . (1.51)
Moreover, by construction of the superact K p, K ≥Σ K p and so by Σ-monotonicity
of I, I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I (Eu ◦ K p). Combining these two inequalities,∫
S×Σ
(Eu ◦ K) d q − I(Eu ◦ K) ≤
∫
S×Σ
(Eu ◦ K p) d p − I (Eu ◦ K p) . (1.52)

















(Eu ◦ K) d p − I(Eu ◦ K)
)
= c∗(p) , (1.53)
and hence c∗ satisfies property (b).
To show that c∗ satisfies property (c), let pΣ ∈ ∆∗(Σ). Since I is Σ-monotonic,
for any K ∈ K0, ∫
S×Σ









Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s)
)





Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) − I(Eu ◦ K)
= I(Eu ◦ K f ) − I(Eu ◦ K) ≤ 0 (1.54)
and in particular,
I(Eu ◦ K f ) − I(Eu ◦ K) = 0. (1.55)
if K = K f for some f ∈ F . Hence, by (1.45) and non-negativity of c∗, we have
c∗(pi × pΣ) = 0, and so property (c) is satisfied.
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Finally, we verify that c∗ also satisfies property (d). To see this, note that for
any sequence of sets E1, E2, .... ∈ 2S×Σ such that E1 ⊃ E2 ⊃ ..., and ⋂n≥1 En = ∅,
there exists some N ∈ N such that n ≥ N implies En = ∅. Hence, by Proposition
29 and Theorem 11 in Maccheroni et al. (2004), and the unboundedness of u,
{p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ)|c∗(p) ≤ t} is a weak* compact subset of ∆(S × Σ) for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore c∗ satisfies property (d), and this concludes the proof that (i) implies
(ii).
For the converse, let I be a real-valued functional on B0(S × Σ, cl(u)), defined
for all K ∈ K0 by









Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ)
]
d pΣ(σ) − c(p)
)
(1.56)
for some grounded, convex, weak* lower semi-continuous function c : ∆∗(S ×
Σ)→ [0,∞] satisfying property (a).
We first show that I is a niveloid. Note that since c(.) is grounded, by (1.56),
I(Eu ◦ Kp) = Eu[p] for any p ∈ ∆(Z). That is, I is normalized. Let K,K′ ∈ K0
such that Eu ◦ K ≥ Eu ◦ K′. Then for any p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ)
J(m(K), p) ≥ J(m(K′), p) , (1.57)
where J(m(K), p) is defined as in (1.46) and thus, by (1.56), I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K′),
showing that I is monotonic. Now let K ∈ K0, p ∈ ∆(Z), and α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we
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have αK + (1 − α)Kp ∈ K0 and, by (1.46),
I
(














m(αK + (1 − α)Kp), p) − c(p))
= max
p∈∆∗(S×Σ)




αJ(m(K), p) − c(p)) + (1 − α)Eu[p]
= I
(
α (Eu ◦ K)) + (1 − α)Eu[p] . (1.58)
Since 0 ∈ int cl(u) and I satisfies monotonicity and (1.58), by Lemma 25 in Mac-
cheroni et al. (2006), I is a niveloid.
To show that I is convex, let K,K′ ∈ K0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then by (1.56),
I
(





















J(m(K), p) − c(p)
)




J(m(K′), q) − c(q)
)
= αI(Eu ◦ K) + (1 − α)I(Eu ◦ K′) (1.59)
as desired.
Since I is a convex, normalized niveloid and u is unbounded, by the obser-
vations on (1.42)–(1.45) and Lemma 25 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) we deduce
that c must be equal to the function c∗ defined in (1.45), and conclude that c is
the unique function satisfying (1.56).
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Next, we verify that I is also singleton-additive. First, let f ∈ F and note that






















Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) − min
p∈∆∗(S×Σ)




Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) (by groundedness) (1.60)
Now let K ∈ K0, f ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1]. By (1.46), (1.56), and (1.60),
I
(



















Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s)
= I(α(Eu ◦ K)) + (1 − α)I(Eu ◦ K f ) (1.61)
and so I is singleton-additive.
Finally, to show that I is Σ-monotone, let K,K′ ∈ K0 such that (Eu ◦ K) ≥Σ









Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ′′) , (1.62)
for all σ′′ ∈ Σ. Hence, for all p ∈ ∆∗(S × Σ)
J(m(K), p) ≥ J(m(K′), p) , (1.63)
and so by (1.46) and (1.56), I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K′), showing that I is Σ-monotone.
This completes the proof.
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1.7.3 Proofs of results in the paper
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let % be a given binary relation onM and define a binary relation %∗ on K0
by way of (1.18).
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that % satisfies the WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC, and
UB axioms. Then by Lemma 1, %∗ satisfies WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC* and
UB*. Thus, by Lemma 2 there exists an unbounded function u : Z → R, a prior
pi ∈ ∆(S) and a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton additive, convex niveloid
I : Eu ◦ K0 → R such that for all K,K′ ∈ K0
K %∗ K′ ⇔ I(Eu ◦ K) ≥ I(Eu ◦ K′) , (1.64)
and for all f ∈ F , I(Eu◦K f ) =
∫
S Eu[ f (s)]dpi(s), and it is w.l.o.g to let 0 ∈ int (u(Z)).
By Lemma 3, there exists an information cost function c∗ : ∆(S × Σ) → [0,∞]
(relative to pi), such that for all K ∈ K0,14









Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ)
]
d pΣ(σ) − c∗(p)
)
. (1.65)
Define V(M) := I(Eu ◦ KM) for all M ∈ M, then by (1.18) and (1.64), V is a repre-
sentation of % on M. Application of the law of iterated expectations gives the
desired representation in Theorem 1, and the uniqueness properties of u, pi and
c∗ follow from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
(ii) implies (i): Let u : Z → R be an unbounded utility index with 0 ∈
int (u(Z)), and c : ∆(S × Σ) → [0,∞] be an information cost function relative
14In particular, it is property (d) of the function c∗ : ∆∗(S × Σ) in Lemma 3, that ensures that
the cost function here can be defined on ∆(S × Σ).
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Eu[ f (s)] d p(s|σ)
]
d pΣ(σ) − c∗(p) , (1.66)
represents the binary relation % onM. Define the function I : Eu ◦ K0 → R as
for all K ∈ K0, I(Eu ◦ K) = V(m(K)). Then I satisfies all the premises of Lemma 3
(ii), and so by Lemma 3 I is a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton-additive and
convex niveloid on Eu ◦K0. Moreover, since V represents %, by definition of the
binary relation %∗, I represents %∗ on K0. Thus, by Lemma 2, %∗ must satisfy
properties WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB* on K0. This implies that %
satisfies properties WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB onM by Lemma 1.
Proof of Observation 1. Define for each M ∈ M an oracle act of M by, for all
s ∈ S
OM(s) = f (s) for some f ∈ M such that { f (s)} % {g(s)} for all g ∈ M. (1.67)
The observation follows directly as (i) V represents %, (ii) % satisfies MON, (iii)
MON implies that for all M ∈ M, M % { f } if f ∈ M, and (iv) MON implies that
{OM} % M.






















θMI(p) if pS = pi
∞ otherwise
. (1.69)
Since mutual information is a non-negative, weak* lower-semicontinuous,
convex function on ∆(S × Σ), c˜ is clearly non-negative, weak* lower-
semicontinuous and convex. We now verify that c˜ also satisfies all three other
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properties of an information cost function. By definition of c˜, property (i) is
satisfied and since MI(p) = 0 when p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ), c˜ also satisfies property (ii).
It remains to show that c˜ also satisfies property (iii). Let p, q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such
that p % q. Then there must exist some Markov kernel K on Σ× 2Σ satisfying for
all (s, σ′) ∈ ∆(S × Σ), q(s, σ′) = ∫
Σ

























p(s, σ)dσ = pS (s) (1.70)
Thus if pS (s) , pi, then c˜(p) = c˜(q) = ∞, and so c˜(p) ≥ c˜(q). Now assume that
pS (s) = pi. Then, since mutual information satisfies the data processing inequal-
ity (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Chapter 2), MI(p) ≥ MI(q) and so c˜(p) ≥ c˜(q).
Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof of (i) implies (ii) follows closely Theorem 1, Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989, Theorem 1) and Maccheroni et al. (2006, Proposition 19). We provide an
outline of the basic steps below, omitting details that would be obvious.
Let % be a binary relation onM satisfying WO, VA, SI, MON, MC and UB,
and define %∗ on K0 by way of (1.18). Then by Lemma 1, %∗ satisfies WO*,
AA*, SI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB*. Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem 1, each
K ∈ K0 admits a constant-singleton equivalent pK by MC*, and the preference
relation %∗ is represented by a convex functional I. It then follows as in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989, Theorem 1, substituting sublinear for superlinear in the
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obvious way) and Lemma 29 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) that there exists an
unbounded u : Z → R, and a weak*-compact, convex set Π ⊂ ∆(S×Σ) such that
Eu[pK] = maxp∈Π
∫
S×Σ; (Eu ◦ K)d p. Moreover, Π is unique and u is unique up to
positive linear transformations.
Also, since SI* implies WSI*, there exist a unique pi ∈ ∆(S × Σ) and an in-
formation cost function c∗ : ∆(S × Σ) → [0,∞] (relative to pi) such that Eu[pK] =
maxp∈∆(S×Σ)
∫
S×Σ (Eu ◦ K) d p−c∗(p). Following exactly the steps in Proposition 19
of Maccheroni et al. (2006, substituting max for min in the obvious way), c∗(p) ∈
{0,∞} for all p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), and Eu[pK] = maxp∈{p′∈∆(S×Σ)|c∗(p′)=0}
∫
S×Σ (Eu ◦ K) d p.
By properties (a)-(d) of c∗ in Theorem 1, we have: (i’) c∗(p) = ∞ for all p ∈
∆(S × Σ) such that pS , pi; (ii’) c∗(p) = 0 if p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ) and pS = pi, (iii’)
c∗(q) = 0 if p % q for some p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such that c∗(p) = 0. Hence, the set
{p′ ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|c∗(p′) = 0} is an information constraint set. Following the steps
of Lemma 3 and the proof of (i) implies (ii) for Theorem 1, one concludes the
sufficiency part of the proof.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), observe that V˜ is clearly a special case of V in
Theorem 1, and hence % satisfies WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB. It remains
















































Hence, V˜(αM + (1 − α){g}) = αV˜(M) + (1 − α)V˜(g), and so clearly % satisfies SI.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let pi ∈ ∆(S×Σ), κ ∈ [0,∞] and define the sets ∆pi(S×Σ) =
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d pS(s) , (1.72)
so we only need to show that Π˜ is an information constraint set.
To see this, note that the mutual information functional MI(.) is weak* lower
semicontinuous in p ∈ ∆(S×Σ) and so, for any κ ≥ 0, the set {p ∈ ∆(S×Σ)|MI(p) ≤
κ} is weak* closed, and is therefore weak* compact. If, on the other hand, κ = ∞,
then {p ∈ ∆(S×Σ)|MI(p) ≤ κ} = ∆(S×Σ), which is weak* compact. Also note that
the set ∆pi(S× Σ) is weak* closed in ∆(S× Σ). Thus, Π˜ is a weak* closed subset of
the set {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|MI(p) ≤ κ}, and hence Π˜ is weak* compact.
Next, we show that Π˜ is convex. Let p, p′ ∈ Π˜ and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then the
probability measure q = αp + (1 − α)p′ ∈ ∆pi(S × Σ). Moreover, by convexity of
the mutual information functional,
MI(q) ≤ αMI(p) + (1 − α)MI(p′)
≤ ακ + (1 − α)κ = κ ,
showing that q ∈ Π˜.
Since MI(p) = 0 for any p ∈ ∆¯(S × Σ), the set ∆¯(S × Σ) ∩ ∆pi(S × Σ) is a subset
of Π˜, showing that Π˜ satisfies property (i) of an information constraint set. Also
note that by definition of Π˜, property (ii) is clearly satisfied.
Last, we verify property (iii). Let p ∈ Π˜ and q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such that p % q. By
the proof of Proposition 1, MI(p) ≥ MI(q) and so MI(q) ≤ κ, implying that q ∈ Π˜.
This shows property (iii) and concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) implies (ii): Let % be a variable attention preference re-
lation that satisfies FA. By Theorem 1,% can be represented by a (pi, u, c)-variable
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attention utility function V : M → R. It is clear from the representation in (1.6)
that for any M,N ∈ M and α ∈ (0, 1), max{V(M),V(N)} ≥ V(αM + (1 − α)N). Thus,
for any M,N ∈ M and α ∈ (0, 1),
M % N ⇒ M % αM + (1 − α)N (1.73)
We now show that %must also satisfy SI. Let M,N ∈ M, f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1).
We first show that M % N implies αM + (1− α){ f } % αN + (1− α){ f }. Suppose
that M % N and let pM ∈ ∆(Z) such that M ∼ {pM}. By WO, {pM} % N, and by FA
and (1.73),
αM + (1 − α){pM} ∼ {pM}
% αN + (1 − α){pM} . (1.74)
Hence by (1.74) and WSI, αM + (1 − α){ f } % αN + (1 − α){ f }.
To show the converse, suppose that αM + (1 − α){ f } % αN + (1 − α){ f } and let
pN ∈ ∆(Z) such that N ∼ {pN}. Then by FA and WSI,
{pM} ∼ αM + (1 − α){pM}
% αN + (1 − α){pM} . (1.75)
Thus, by (1.75), WSI and FA,
α{pM} + (1 − α){pN} % αN + (1 − α){pN}
∼ {pN} . (1.76)
Hence, by (1.76) and WSI,
{pM} % α{pN} + (1 − α){pM} . (1.77)
If α = 1/2, by (1.76) and (1.77), M ∼ {pM} % {pN} ∼ N, and so we are done.
Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume that α > 1/2 (the argument for
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α < 1/2 is analogous). Let β = 1−α
α
∈ (0, 1). Using (1.76) and Step 1,
(1 − α){pM} + α{pN} = β [α{pM} + (1 − α){pN}] + (1 − β){pN}
% {pN} . (1.78)
Hence, by (1.77) and (1.78), {pM} % {pN}, so M % N, and % satisfies SI.
Since % satisfies SI, it satisfies every premise of Theorem 2, there must exist
a compact set Π ⊂ ∆(S × Σ) such that the information cost function c(.) satisfies:
c(p) =

0 if p ∈ Π
∞ otherwise
Hence, for all M ∈ M, we can write V(M) = maxp∈Π J(M, p), where the function
J(., .) is defined in (1.46). Let Π(M) = arg maxp∈Π J(M, p) for every M ∈ M. Since Π
is compact and J is continuous in p, Π(M) is non-empty and closed. Moreover,
if M,N ∈ M such that there exist some α > 0 and β ∈ R satisfying Eu ◦ KM =
α(Eu ◦ KN) + β, then Π(M) = Π(N).
We claim that
⋂
M∈M′ Π(M) , ∅ for any finiteM′ ⊂ M. That is, the collection
of sets {Π(M) ⊂ Π : M ∈ M} satisfies the finite intersection property. To see this,
let M′ be a finite subset of M and, in view of the preceding remark, assume
w.l.o.g that M ∼ N for all M,N ∈ M′. Enumerate the finite setM′ = {M1, ..,Mn}
for some n ≥ 1. If n = 1, then claim holds trivially. Assume, therefore, that
n ≥ 2. Let αi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that (∑ni=1 αi) = 1, and define
M = (
∑n
i=1 αiMi). Since Mi ∼ M j for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, by repeated application of
FA, it follows that M ∼ Mi for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Thus, for any p ∈ Π(M),







αiV(Mi) = V(M) (1.79)
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showing that J(Mi, p) = V(Mi) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and so p ∈ ⋂M∈M′ Π(M),
establishing the claim.
Since Π is compact and the set {Π(M) ⊂ Π : M ∈ M} is a collection of
closed sets in Π which satisfies the finite intersection property, it follows that⋂
M∈MΠ(M) , ∅ (see, e.g., Munkres, 1975, Theorem 5.9, p. 170). That is, there
exists some p ∈ Π such that V(M) = J(M, p) for all M ∈ M, showing that (ii)
holds.
Moreover, if q ∈ Π is another joint distribution such that J(M, q) = V(M) for
all M ∈ M, then p and q must be “equally informative” Gollier (2004, Lemma
9 and Proposition 87, pp. 362–366). Thus, by Blackwell (1953)’s equivalence
result, p ' q (see Kihlstrom, 1984, Theorems 1–6, pp. 18–23).
(ii) implies (i): Let % be a binary relation onM represented by the function
Vˇ :M→ R given in (1.13). It is readily seen that Vˇ is a (pi, u, c)-variable attention
utility function, and so % is a variable attention preference relation by Theorem
1. Moreover, since Vˇ(M) is a linear functional onM, % satisfies FA, and thus (i)
holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let %1,%2 be preferences with variable attention onM
represented by (u1, pi1, c1) and (u2, pi2, c2), respectively.
Suppose that %2 is more attentive than %1. By (1.14), for all p,q ∈ ∆(Z),
{p} ∼1 {q} implies {p} ∼2 {q}. We claim that we must also have {p} 1 {q} implies
{p} 2 {q} for all p,q ∈ ∆(Z), and hence that u1 ≈ u2. Assume for contradiction
that there exist some p,q ∈ ∆(Z) such that {p} 1 {q} and {p} ∼2 {q}. Since u2 is
non-constant, there exists some r ∈ ∆(Z) such that either {r} 2 {p} or {q} 2 {r}.
Assume w.l.o.g that the former is true. By (1.14), it follows that {r} 1 {p} and so
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by MC, there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that α{r} + (1 − α){q} ∼1 {p}. Then again
by (1.14), it must follow that α{r} + (1 − α){q} ∼2 {p} ∼2 {q}. Since Eu2 is affine on
∆(Z), it follows that
αEu2[r] + (1 − α)Eu2[q] = Eu2[αr + (1 − α)q]
= Eu2[q] , (1.80)
showing that Eu2[r] = Eu2[q] and so {r} ∼2 {q}, a contradiction. This proves the
claim.
We now show that pi1 = pi2. Assume for contradiction that this is not true.
Then there must exists some s ∈ S such that pi1(s) , pi2(s). Also, since u1 is non-
constant, there exist some q, r ∈ ∆(Z) such that {q} 1 {r}. Let f ∈ F such that
f (s) = q and f (s′) = r for all s′ ∈ S \{s} and let p f ∈ ∆(Z) such that {p f } ∼1 { f }.
Then,





and, since u1 ≈ u2,





Also, by (1.14), we must have {p f } ∼2 { f } implying that





Combining (1.81) and (1.82), Eu2[q] = Eu2[r] and so Eu1[q] = Eu1[r], which
implies that {q} ∼1 {r}, a contradiction.
By the preceding arguments, it follows that pi1 = pi2 = pi and u1 ≈ u2, so it
is w.l.o.g to set u1 = u2 = u. Denote the niveloids corresponding to the repre-
sentations of %1 and %2 on K0 in Lemma 3 by I1 and I2, respectively. By the
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supposition, if M ∼1 { f } for some M, { f } ∈ M, then M %2 { f }, and therefore
I1(Eu ◦ KM) =
∫
S
Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) ≤ I2(Eu ◦ KM) , (1.83)









(Eu ◦ K) d p − I2(Eu ◦ K)
)
= c2(p) , (1.84)
for all p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), proving that (1.) implies (2.).
To prove the converse, suppose that pi1 = pi2 = pi, u1 = u2 = u, and c1 ≥ c2. Let









Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) . (1.85)









Eu[ f (s)] d pi(s) , (1.86)
and so M %2 { f } showing that (2.) implies (1.).
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 3, %2 is more attentive than%1 iff pi1 = pi2 =
pi, u1 ≈ u2, and c1 ≥ c2 when u1 = u2.
(A) Let %1,%2 be preferences with constrained attention on M represented
by (u1, pi1,Π1) and (u2, pi2,Π2), respectively. By the proof of Theorem 2, Πi = {p ∈
∆(S × Σ)|ci(p) = 0} where ci : ∆(S × Σ) → {0,∞}, for constrained attention prefer-
ences %i, where i = 1, 2. Hence, setting pi1 = pi2 = pi and u1 = u2 = u, we have %2
is more attentive than %1 iff c1(p) = 0 implies c2(p) = 0, equivalently Π1 ⊂ Π2.
(B) Let %1 and %2 be preference relations with fixed attention on M, rep-
resented by (pi1, u1, p1) and (pi2, u2, p2), respectively. By the proof of Theorem 3,
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Λ(pi) = {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|ci(p) = 0} where ci : ∆(S × Σ) → {0,∞}, for fixed attention
preferences %i, where i = 1, 2. Hence, setting pi1 = pi2 = pi and u1 = u2 = u, we
have %2 is more attentive than %1 iff c1(p) = 0 implies c2(p) = 0, equivalently
Λ(p1) ⊂ Λ(p2) or p2 % p1.
Proof of Proposition 4. In view of the preceding results, it is readily seen that
(vi)⇔ (v)⇔ (iv)⇔ (iii)⇒ (ii)⇒ (i) .
We complete the proof by showing that (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii).
First, suppose that (i) holds. Let% be preference relation with variable atten-
tion which satisfies SMON. For any menu M ∈ M, observe that by (1.67) for ev-
ery f ∈ M and every s ∈ S, {OM(s)} % { f (s)} and thus {OM} % M by SMON. Simi-
lary, by (1.67) for every s ∈ S there exists some f ∈ M such that { f (s)} ∼ {OM(s)}
and so M % {OM} by SMON. Hence, SMON implies that {OM} ∼ M, and so















where the second equality follows from the definition of an oracle act in (1.67).
Thus, (ii) holds.
Now assume that (ii) holds. By Theorem 1, for any p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)
c(p) =

0 if p ∈ ∆¯pi(S × Σ)
∞ if p < ∆pi(S × Σ)
c ∈ [0,∞] otherwise
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To show that c must be equal to 0, let p ∈ ∆pi(S × Σ). Take any K′ ∈ K0. By (ii) it
follows that m(K′) ∼ {Om(K′)}, and so K′ ∼∗ KOm(K′) . Thus by Lemma 2,
















where the last equality follows from pS = pi. By definition of an oracle act, we












dp ≤ 0 . (1.89)
Thus, it follows from (1.45), (1.88) and (1.89) that c(p) = 0. This shows that (iii)
holds and concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. In view of the preceding results, it is straightforward to
see that
(vi)⇔ (v)⇔ (iv)⇔ (iii)⇒ (ii)⇒ (i) .
We complete the proof by showing that (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii).
First, suppose that (i) holds; that is, let % be variable attention preference
relation which satisfies the axiom NA. Consider any menu M ∈ M. Since M is
finite, there exists some %-maximal element g ∈ M such that {g} % { f } for all f ∈
M. By repeated application of NA, it follows that {g} ∼ M, and so V(M) = V({g})
by Theorem 1. Also, since the information cost function c(.) is grounded, for
any singleton menu { f } ⊂ M, V({ f }) = ∫
S
Eu[ f (s)]dpi(s) by Theorem (1). Hence, as
{g} % { f } for all f ∈ M, infer that V({g}) = max f∈M
∫
S
Eu[ f (s)]dpi(s), showing that
(ii) holds.
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Now suppose that (ii) holds. By Theorem 1, for any p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)
c(p) =

0 if p ∈ ∆¯pi(S × Σ)
∞ if p < ∆pi(S × Σ)
c ∈ [0,∞] otherwise
In order to show that c must be equal to∞, let p ∈ ∆pi(S×Σ)\∆¯pi(S×Σ). Then there
must exist some signal σ∗ ∈ Σ such that the corresponding posterior distribution
p(.|σ∗) , pi. By definition of a conditional distribution, pΣ(σ∗) > 0. Now let





Eu[ f (s)]dp(s|σ∗) . (1.90)
Let K ∈ K0 be a superact such that for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ,
K(s, σ) =

g(s) if σ = σ∗
f (s) otherwise
(1.91)
Thus, m(K) = { f , g} and, since (ii) holds, m(K) ∼ { f }. Therefore K ∼∗ K f , and so
by Lemma 2,
I(Eu ◦ K) = I
(










Eu ◦ K f
)
dp , (1.92)
















Eu[g(s)] − Eu[ f (s)])dp(s|σ∗)
 > 0 . (1.93)
Since u is unbounded, the right hand side of above inequality can be arbitrarily
large. Hence, infer that c(p) = ∞, establishing that (iii) holds.
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CHAPTER 2
ON REPRESENTATION OF MONOTONE PREFERENCES
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of representability of monotone preference
orders on a sequence space.1 Monotone preferences are especially compelling in
the theory of social evaluation of intertemporal utility streams since if no one
is worse off, then the society as a whole should not be worse off (see Diamond
(1965, p.172)). However, monotone preferences (expressing that “more is bet-
ter”) have also been used in the theory of individual preferences on commodity
bundles, at least since the study of Wold (1943).2
The general characterization of representability of a preference ordering is
the order dense property,3and this, of course, applies to our setting.4 However,
as is well known, the order dense property can be difficult to apply to con-
crete examples to decide on the representability (or non-representability) of a
preference ordering. Thus, our objective is to present a sufficient condition for
representability which provides a partial characterization but which is relatively
easy to check in concrete examples.
We focus on a novel concept of scalar continuity of preferences, which may be
1We consider both finite and infinite sequence spaces as the theory developed here holds
regardless of the dimension of the space.
2For a comprehensive discussion of Wold’s result on the existence of a continuous utility
function representing a preference order, see Beardon and Mehta (1994).
3Order dense property requires the existence of a countable subset which is dense in its given
superset with respect to the underlying order topology. For a formal definition of this notion,
see Remark 1, p.8.
4For expositions of this characterization result, see Fishburn (1970), Kreps (1988) and Bridges
and Mehta (1995).
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described as follows. Given any utility stream x, consider the set of constant util-
ity streams which are at least as good as x, and the set of constant utility streams
which are at most as good as x. These sets can be identified with sets of scalars,
since constant utility streams are scalar multiples of the constant utility stream
with constant utility equal to one. The preference order is scalar continuous if
these sets of scalars are closed subsets of the real line. Thus scalar continuity
requires continuity of preferences on the diagonal of the space of utility streams,
and is therefore easy to verify. One of our main results (Proposition 7) is that a
monotone, scalar continuous preference order can always be represented by a
real valued function.
Here is a brief outline of the contents of the paper. Section 2.2 introduces
the notation and definitions. In section 2.3, we associate with any monotone
preference order a pseudo utility function µ which provides a weak representation
of the order.5 No continuity condition is imposed to obtain this pseudo utility
function.
In section 2.4, we present our main representation results. In Proposition 7,
we show that if the order satisfies a scalar continuity condition, then it is repre-
sentable by the function µ.6 Generalizing this result, we establish in Theorem 4
that when the set of equivalence classes (indifference curves) which have points
of scalar discontinuity, is countable, then there exists a representation for the
order. We indicate how countable scalar discontinuity condition can be used to
verify the order dense property. However, this condition is not equivalent to
the order dense property; an example is given to show that countable scalar dis-
continuity is not necessary for representability of a monotone preference order.
5This terminology follows Peleg (1970).
6This terminology follows Weibull (1985), who uses a similar concept of continuity.
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In section 2.5, we consider a number of representation results which have
been developed in the literature. We show that these results can be derived
easily by applying Proposition 7 and Theorem 4.
In section 2.6, we provide two examples to illustrate the relationship be-
tween our concept of scalar continuity, and the concepts of sup-norm continuity
and restricted continuity used in the literature.
2.2 Notation and Definitions
Let N denote, as usual, the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...}, and let R denote
the set of real numbers. Let Y denote the closed interval [0, 1], and let X denote
the set YM where M ∈ N ∪ {∞}.7 Thus, x ∈ X if and only if xn ∈ [0, 1] for all
n ∈ N such that n ≤ M for some M ∈ N ∪ {∞}. One can interpret xn as the utility
level of generation n, and x as an infinite stream of these utility levels or xn as
the consumption level of good n, and x as a finite bundle of these consumption
levels.
The constant sequence of zeros in X will be denoted by 0, and the constant
sequence of ones in X will be denoted by e. We denote the set of all constant
sequences in X, {λe ∈ X : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, by C and we call it the diagonal in X.
For y, z ∈ RM with M ∈ N ∪ {∞}, we write y ≥ z if yi ≥ zi for all i ∈ N such that
i ≤ M; y > z if y ≥ z, and y , z, and y  z if yi > zi for all i ∈ N such that i ≤ M.
A preference ordering is a binary relation, % on X , which is complete and
7We use this notation to accommodate both the finite dimensional and infinite dimensional
sequence spaces.
75
transitive. We associate with% its asymmetric and symmetric components by 
and ∼ respectively.
A preference ordering % on X is called monotone (M) if the following condi-
tion holds:
(M) If x, y ∈ X and x ≥ y, then x % y.
We say that a preference ordering % on X is strongly monotone (SM) if it satis-
fies the following efficiency condition:
(SM) If x, y ∈ X, with x > y, then x  y.
When x and y are utility streams, then (SM) is the standard Pareto princi-
ple. Clearly the former efficiency condition is implied by the latter one. Strong
monotonicity also implies the following condition called weak Pareto:
(WP) If x, y ∈ X and x  y, then x  y.
A preference ordering % on X is representable if there is a function, u : X → R,
such that for all x, y ∈ X,
x % y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) (R)
Given a preference ordering % on X, for each x ∈ X the Lower and Upper
Contour Sets are defined as LC(x) = {y ∈ X : x % y} and UC(x) = {y ∈ X : y % x}
respectively.
Given a topology T for X, we say that % is T−continuous on X if for each
x ∈ X, the lower and upper contour sets ( LC(x) and UC(x)) of x are closed subsets
of X in the topology T .
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2.3 Weak Representation of a Monotone Preference Order
We will associate with a monotone preference order% on X a pseudo utility func-
tion µ : X → R which provides a weak representation of it; that is,
If x, y ∈ X and x % y, then µ(x) ≥ µ(y) (WR)
Condition WR implies that if x, y ∈ X and x ∼ y, then µ(x) = µ(y). Also, if
x, y ∈ X and µ(x) > µ(y), then x  y. However, it allows for the possibility that
x, y ∈ X satisfy x  y, but µ(x) = µ(y). It is in this respect that the representation is
weak.
For each x ∈ X define the following subsets of the [0, 1] interval:
A(x) = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λe % x}; B(x) = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : x % λe} (2.1)
Note that while upper and lower contour sets are subsets of X, the sets A(x) and
B(x) are subsets of the real line.
Proposition 6 Let % be a monotone preference ordering on X. Then, % has a weak
representation.
Proof. We obtain a weak representation as follows. For each x ∈ X, define A(x)
as in (2.1) and let α(x) be the infimum of the set A(x). That is:
α(x) = inf
λ∈A(x)
λ for each x ∈ X (2.2)
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Note that since % is monotone, A(x) is non-empty and so α(x) is well-defined.
Clearly, α(x) ∈ [0, 1] for each x ∈ X. We claim that α(x) satisfies condition WR.
Let x, y ∈ X satisfy x % y. By (2.1), we have A(x) ⊂ A(y) and thus α(x) ≥ α(y) by
the monotonicity of an infimum.
Note that α is not the only possible weak representation of % on X. For
instance, one can define B(x) as in (2.1) and let β(x) be the supremum of the set
B(x) for each x ∈ X. That is:
β(x) = sup
λ∈B(x)
λ for each x ∈ X (2.3)
Since % is monotone, B(x) is non-empty and thus β(x) is well-defined. Clearly,
β(x) ∈ [0, 1] for each x ∈ X. Moreover, if x, y ∈ X with x % y, then B(x) ⊃ B(y)
by (2.1) and so β(x) ≥ β(y) by the monotonicity of a supremum. Therefore, β
satisfies condition WR and is a weak representation of % on X.
In general, these two functions, α and β, need not be equal. However, α(x)
can be at most β(x) for each x ∈ X. For if α(x) > β(x) for some x ∈ X, then we can
pick some θ ∈ (β(x), α(x)). Since % is complete and thus A(x) ∪ B(x) = [0, 1] by
(2.1), θ ∈ (0, 1) must belong to A(x) or B(x). However, if θ ∈ A(x), we must have
θ ≥ α(x) by (2.2), a contradiction. And, if θ ∈ B(x), we must have θ ≤ β(x) by
definition of β(x), a contradiction. Thus we have:
α(x) ≤ β(x) for all x ∈ X (2.4)
In addition, by using α and β one can define many similar functions as well
to serve as weak representations for the preference order %. To see this, let
k ∈ (0, 1) and define the function µk : X → [0, 1] as follows:
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µk(x) = kα(x) + (1 − k)β(x) for all x ∈ X (2.5)
Then if we let x, y ∈ X with x % y, we get µk(x) = kα(x) + (1 − k)β(x) ≥ kα(y) + (1 −
k)β(y) = µk(y) exhibiting (WR).
We note here that if the preference order is monotone and satisfies Weak
Pareto, then it can be shown that α(x) = β(x) = µk(x) for all k in (0, 1). How-
ever, monotone preference orders satisfying Weak Pareto need not be repre-
sentable. The well-known example of the lexicographic preference order (see
Debreu (1954)) satisfies Strong Monotonicity, and therefore is a monotone pref-
erence order satisfying Weak Pareto, but is not representable.8
2.4 Representation of a Monotone Preference Order
In this section, we use the weak representation result of Section 2.3 to provide
a representation for monotone preference orders. For this purpose, we use a
weak notion of continuity of preferences, called scalar continuity, to present our
first representation result (Proposition 7). We then generalize this result to cover
cases in which preference orders might exhibit a limited extent of scalar discon-
tinuity (Theorem 4).
The following lemma is useful in obtaining our representation results.
Lemma 4 Let % be a monotone preference ordering on X. Suppose x in X is a point
8For a comprehensive study of complete preference orders which are not representable by
a real valued function, see Beardon et al. (2002). As the characterization result in that paper
indicates, these turn out to be of four types; an open question is which types can occur for
complete preference orders which are monotone.
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such that the sets A(x) and B(x) defined in (2.1) have a non-empty intersection. Then
µk(x)e ∼ x where µk is defined in (2.5).
Proof. Let x be in X be such that A(x) ∩ B(x) is non-empty. We have α(x) ≤ β(x)
by (2.4) and so we have two cases to consider; (i) α(x) < β(x), (ii) α(x) = β(x). In
case (i), using (2.5) we get α(x) < µk(x) < β(x). Then by (2.2) and (2.3), we have
µk(x) ∈ A(x)∩B(x) and so by (1), x ∼ µk(x)e. In case (ii), we have α(x) = µk(x) = β(x)
by (2.5). Thus given that A(x) ∩ B(x) is non-empty and using (2.2) and (2.3), for
any λ ∈ A(x) ∩ B(x), we get α(x) ≤ λ ≤ β(x), and so λ = µk(x). This shows that
µk(x) ∈ A(x) ∩ B(x) and therefore by (2.1), we infer that x ∼ µk(x)e.
The following weak notion of continuity will be used in the next representa-
tion result.
Definition 5 We say that % is scalar continuous on X if for each x ∈ X, the sets A(x)
and B(x) defined in (2.1) are closed in the standard topology on R.
Sup-norm continuity (see Example 3 in Section 2.5) implies Restricted con-
tinuity (see Example 4 in Section 2.5), which in turn implies Scalar continuity.
Further, there are monotone preference orders which satisfy Scalar continuity,
but violate Restricted continuity (see Example 5 in the Appendix) and (there-
fore) Sup-norm continuity. Also, there are monotone preference orders which
satisfy Restricted continuity but violate Sup-norm continuity (see Example 6 in
the Appendix).
We can now state the following representation result for monotone prefer-
ence orders.
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Proposition 7 If a monotone preference ordering % is scalar continuous on X, then %
is representable, and µk, defined in (2.5), represents it.
Proof. We know by (2.5) that µk is a weak representation of %. Thus it remains
to show that when x, y ∈ X and x  y, we must have µk(x) > µk(y).
Since % is scalar continuous, A(x) and B(x) are closed subsets in [0, 1] for
each x ∈ X. Moreover, since % in X is complete, then the union A(x) ∪ B(x)
exhausts the interval [0, 1] which is a connected set. Thus, A(x) ∩ B(x) must be
non-empty for all x ∈ X. Thus, by Lemma 4 we have µk(x)e ∼ x  y ∼ µk(y)e so
that µk(x)e  µk(y)e by transitivity. This implies µk(x) , µk(y), and since by (WR),
µk(x) ≥ µk(y), we must have µk(x) > µk(y).
2.4.1 A Refinement of the Representation Result
For any preference order % on X, let:
D = {x ∈ X : A(x) ∩ B(x) = ∅}
When x ∈ D, we refer to it as a point of scalar discontinuity of the preference
order % on X. When D is empty, we say that the order % has no points of scalar
discontinuity in X.
The ability to represent % depends crucially on (loosely speaking) “how
many” points of scalar discontinuity there are. To make this notion precise, we
make the preliminary remark that if x ∈ X is a point of scalar discontinuity, and
y ∼ x, then y is also a point of scalar discontinuity. To see this, suppose x ∈ D.
Since y ∼ x, we have A(x) = A(y) and B(x) = B(y), and so A(y)∩ B(y) = ∅ implying
that y ∈ D.
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In view of this remark, proceed to form the following partition of D. For each
x ∈ D, let E(x) = {z ∈ X : z ∼ x}; clearly E(x) is non-empty since x ∈ E(x). For all
x, y ∈ X, we have either E(x) disjoint from E(y), or E(x) = E(y); further:⋃
x∈D
E(x) = D
Let = be the collection {E(x) for some x ∈ D}. Then, = is a partition of D. In
order to see “how much” scalar discontinuity the preference order exhibits, it is
enough to look at “how many” equivalence classes there are in =. We can now
introduce the following condition:
Countable Scalar Discontinuity Condition:
The collection = has at most a countable number of equivalence classes.
We now show that this countable scalar discontinuity condition is sufficient
for the representability of a monotone preference order.
Theorem 4 If a monotone preference ordering % on X satisfies the countable scalar
discontinuity condition, then % is representable.
Proof. Let {F1, F2, ...} be an enumeration of the set =. For each Fn ∈ =, let r(Fn) =





Fn∈=′ r(Fn) if =′ is non-empty
0 otherwise
(2.6)
Note that since the sequence {r(Fn)} is summable, pi is well-defined, and indeed
for any =′ ∈ F, pi(=′) ∈ [0, 1].
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For each x ∈ X, let W(x) = {y ∈ X : x  y} and P(x) = {y ∈ X : y  x}. Note that
for any x ∈ X, the sets W(x) and P(x) together separate = into its subsets as for
any Fn ∈ =, either Fn ⊂ W(x) or Fn ⊂ P(x) or Fn∩ [W(x)∪P(x)] = ∅. For any x ∈ X,
let =∗(x) = {Fn ∈ = : Fn ⊂ W(x)} and =∗(x) = {Fn ∈ = : Fn ⊂ P(x)}, and define the
function:
ρ(x) = pi(=∗(x)) − pi(=∗(x)) (2.7)
Since pi is bounded on F, ρ is well-defined. Now consider the function u : X → R
defined as:
u(x) = µk(x) + ρ(x) (2.8)
where µk is defined in (2.5). We claim that u represents the ordering % on X.9
Let x, y ∈ X such that x % y. Then by the definition of the sets =∗ and =∗, we
have =∗(y) ⊂ =∗(x) and =∗(x) ⊂ =∗(y). Thus by (2.6) and (2.7), we get ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y)
and so by (2.5) and (2.8), u(x) ≥ u(y).
Now let x, y ∈ X such that x  y. By (2.5) we have µk(x) ≥ µk(y). If µk(x) > µk(y),
then we have u(x) > u(y) by (2.8) and the fact that ρ(x) ≥ ρ(y). If, however,
µk(x) = µk(y), then x ∈ D or y ∈ D must hold. Otherwise, by Lemma 4 we have
x ∼ y, a contradiction. In both cases, x ∈ D or y ∈ D, one of the two set inclusions,
=∗(y) ⊂ =∗(x) and =∗(x) ⊂ =∗(y), must be strict and so we must have ρ(x) > ρ(y).
Thus, by (2.8) u(x) > u(y) which establishes the claim.
Remark 4 Using the countable scalar discontinuity condition, one can directly check
the order dense property for any monotone preference order; that is, one can find a
9Our representation shows a link between measure and utility theory as the function pi, de-
fined in (2.6), is a simple measurable function. On a general approach using measure theory in
constructing a representation, see Voorneveld and Weibull (2009).
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countable subset Z which is order dense in X.10 To see this, let Q = {qe ∈ X : for some
rational number q}. Then Q ⊂ X is countable. By countable scalar discontinuity, =
is countable and so by using the Axiom of Denumerable Choice 11, one can pick an
element from each E ∈ =; call this g(E). Then the set F = {g(E) ∈ X : E ∈ =} is also
countable and so Z = Q ∪ F is a countable subset of X. We now verify that Z is order
dense in X.
Let x, y ∈ X, with x  y. There are two cases to consider; i) either x or y ∈ D
or ii) neither x nor y ∈ D. In case i), without loss of generality, let x ∈ D. Then
z = g(E(x)) ∈ F and x ∼ z. Thus we have x % z % y. In case ii), we have µk(x) > µk(y)
by Lemma 4 and so there exists z = qe ∈ Q such that µk(x) > q > µk(y). By monotonicity
of the order, we then have µk(x)e % qe % µk(y)e and so x % z % y. This shows that Z is
order dense in X.12
Remark 5 A topic that has been discussed extensively in the social choice literature is
the possible incompatibility of an efficiency concept like Strong Pareto with an equity
concept like Anonymity when X = Y∞. Basu and Mitra (2003) showed that any pref-
erence order satisfying Strong Pareto and Anonymity cannot be represented by a real
valued function. Further, although Svensson (1980) showed that preference orders sat-
isfying Strong Pareto and Anonymity exist, the results of Zame (2007) and Lauwers
(2010) imply that such preferences cannot be constructed and require the use of the
Axiom of Choice or similar contrivance for demonstrating their existence.
Our Theorem 4 implies that any preference order satisfying Strong Pareto and
10Z is order dense in X (in the sense of Debreu) if x, y ∈ X and x  y imply that there is some
z ∈ Z, such that x % z % y. (See Bridges and Mehta (1995, p.11-12)).
11This axiom of set theory is a weak form of the Axiom of Choice. For an exposition of the
Axiom of Choice, see (Munkres, 1975, p.59).
12Thus the result of Theorem 4 also follows by appealing to the order dense characterization
result on representability if one grants the Axiom of Denumerable Choice.
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Anonymity must have an uncountable number of equivalence classes, which have points
of scalar discontinuity. Recall that if x ∈ X is a point of scalar discontinuity, then there
is no λ ∈ [0, 1] such that λe is indifferent to x. [For, if there were such a λ, then this λ
would belong to both A(x) and B(x), contradicting the fact that x is a point of scalar dis-
continuity]. Thus, there is an uncountable number of indifference curves, generated by
such a preference order, which are disjoint from the diagonal of X. This provides further
insight about the nature of efficient and equitable preference orders on infinite utility
streams.
An Example
We now present an example in X = Y2 to show that the countable scalar dis-
continuity condition is not a necessary condition for representability of a mono-
tone preference order % . This also shows that for monotone preference orders,
countable scalar discontinuity is not equivalent to the order dense property.
Thus, Theorem 4 is only a partial characterization of the representability of a
monotone preference order.
Let us define u(x1, x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X = Y2 as follows:
u(x1, x2) =

x1 for x1 ∈ [0, (1/2))
(1/2) + x2 for x1 = (1/2)
1 + x1 for x1 ∈ ((1/2), 1]
(2.9)
Then, define % on X as follows. For x, y ∈ X, x % y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y). Then
% is clearly a preference order, and it is monotone.
Let U = {x ∈ X : x1 = (1/2) and x2 ∈ ((1/2), 1]}. Note that whenever x ∈ U,
we have A(x) = ((1/2), 1] and B(x) = [0, (1/2)]. Thus D ⊃ U. Moreover, for any
x, x′ ∈ U, we have x ∼ x′ if and only if x = x′. Thus, = ⊃ {{x} : x ∈ U} and so = is
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uncountable. But, (2.9) is clearly a representation of % on X.
2.5 Applications of the Representation Result
We now consider four different representation results which have been derived
in the literature. Our aim, here, is to show that each example below provides
sufficient conditions to derive scalar continuity and/or countable scalar discon-
tinuity conditions, and thereby to demonstrate that these well-known represen-
tation results follow from our results established in Section 2.4.
Example 1: Wold’s Representation
The first theory on the existence of a continuous representation for a prefer-
ence order was given in a fundamental paper of Wold (1943). Wold considers
strongly monotone preference order, and establishes a representation by show-
ing that every indifference class meets the diagonal given the condition below.
We show how this result can be obtained by applying Proposition 7.
Let X = Yn for some n ∈ N and let% be a strongly monotone preference order
on X satisfying the following continuity condition:
Wold: For any x, y, z ∈ X such that x  y  z, there exist some a, b ∈ (0, 1) such
that ax + (1 − a)z  y  bx + (1 − b)z.
Using strongly monotone preferences, x ∼ 0 if and only if x = 0, and x ∼ e
if and only if x = e. Further A(0) = [0, 1], B(0) = {0}, and A(e) = {1}, B(e) = [0, 1].
Thus, for x ∼ 0, A(x) and B(x) are closed sets; and for x ∼ e, A(x) and B(x) are
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closed sets. Consider then any x ∈ X, such that e  x  0. We show that A(x)
is closed as follows. Let {λs}∞s=1 be a convergent sequence of elements in A(x),
converging to λ0. We have to show that λ0 ∈ A(x). If this is not the case, then we
have λ0 ∈ [0, 1], and e  x  λ0e. So, λ0 < 1, and by Wold’s condition, there is
b ∈ (0, 1), such that x  [bλ0+(1−b)]e. Since λs → λ0 as s→ ∞ and λ0 < [bλ0+(1−b)]
, we can find s′ large enough for which λs′ < [bλ0 + (1 − b)]. But, then, x  λs′e,
a contradiction to the fact that λs ∈ A(x) for all s ∈ N. Thus, λ0 ∈ A(x), and A(x)
is closed. We can show that B(x) is closed by following a similar line of proof.
Thus, the preference order % satisfies scalar continuity and is representable, by
using Proposition 7.
If the preference order is monotone but not strongly monotone, the sets A(x)
and B(x) need not be closed for all x ∈ X. Consider the preference relation % on
X for which x ∼ e if xn > 0 for some n ∈ N, and e  0. This is easily seen to
be a preference order, which is monotone. Further, Wold’s condition is trivially
satisfied since one cannot find three points x, y, z in X satisfying x  y  z. Now,
if x ∈ X with x , 0, then A(x) = (0, 1], so A(x) is not closed. Thus, % does not
satisfy scalar continuity, and Proposition 7 is not applicable.
However, if the preference order is monotone, and Wold’s condition is satis-
fied, we can still show that the preference order is representable by using The-
orem 4 as follows. By using Wold’s condition, one can show the following fact
(see Fishburn (1970, p.33)).
Fact: If x, y, z ∈ X such that x > y > z, then there exists some a ∈ [0, 1] such
that y ∼ ax + (1 − a)z.
We claim that there is no point of scalar discontinuity of % and thus by The-
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orem 4, % is representable. To see this, let y ∈ X. We have e ≥ y ≥ 0. If y = 0 or
y = e, then A(y) ∩ B(y) is non-empty. If y , 0 and y , e, then e > y > 0. Then by
the fact above, there is some a in [0, 1] such that y ∼ ae + (1 − a)0 = ae showing
that A(y) ∩ B(y) is non-empty for any y ∈ X.
Example 2: Weighted Utilitarian Representation
In the theory of social choice, one of the prominent judgment criteria on the
welfare of the society is called (weighted) utilitarianism. This method seeks to
maximize the society’s collective welfare obtained by summing (weighted) indi-
vidual utilities (see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) for a discussion of available
characterization results). We show below how one can achieve the existence of
a representation for a preference order satisfying a set of axioms used in this
literature.
Let X = Yn for some n ∈ N and let % be a monotone preference order on X
satisfying WP and the following two conditions:
Minimal Individual Symmetry (MIS): For all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, there exist
x, y ∈ X such that xi > yi, x j < y j, xk = yk for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}\{i, j}, and x ∼ y.
Strong Invariance (SI): For all x, y ∈ X, x % y implies that for all z ∈ Rn and
all b ∈ R++, we have (bx + z) % (by + z) whenever (bx + z), (by + z) ∈ X.
We claim that % is scalar continuous on X. Let I = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. By using
MIS, SI and WP, we can easily find a unique vector (qi)i∈I  0 such that ei ∼ qie
for each i ∈ I. Thus by using SI, we can infer that for any x ∈ X, x ∼ λ(x)e where
λ(x) =
∑
i∈I qixi. Note that for all x in X we have λ(x) ∈ [0, 1] since ∑i∈I qi = 1 and
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xi ∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ I, and thus λ(x) ∈ A(x) ∩ B(x).
Since the preference order satisfies WP, we can infer that α(x) = β(x) for all
x in X. To see this, let α(x) < β(x). Define ε = β(x) − α(x), and find δ ∈ (0, (ε/2)),
µ ∈ A(x) and η ∈ B(x) such that µ < α(x)+δ and η > β(x)−δ. Then, η > β(x)−(ε/2) =
[β(x) − α(x)] + α(x) − (ε/2) = α(x) + (ε/2) > µ so that we have, using the fact that
% is monotone x % ηe  µe % x contradicting the transitivity of % .
Since λ(x) ∈ A(x) ∩ B(x), we have a non-empty intersection of A(x) and B(x)
and thus we must have λ(x) = α(x) = β(x) for each x ∈ X. Thus α(x) ∈ A(x) and
β(x) ∈ B(x) and so A(x) = [λ(x), 1] and B(x) = [0, λ(x)] by (2.2) and (2.3). This
shows that A(x) and B(x) are closed in Y and therefore the preference order is
scalar continuous, and has a representation by using Proposition 7.
Mitra and Ozbek (2010) show that whenever a preference order satisfies MIS,
Invariance (a weaker form of SI), WP, and has a representation, then it also has a
weighted utilitarian representation. Thus Proposition 7, together with the con-
ditions above, ensures a weighted utilitarian representation for the preference
ordering.
Example 3: Diamond’s Representation on Infinite Utility Streams
The framework for analysis of social preference orders on infinite utility
streams was introduced by Koopmans (1960). Diamond (1965) established the
existence of a representation for monotone preference orders, which satisfy
weak Pareto and sup-norm continuity. We now show how his existence result
can be derived from Proposition 7.13
13This approach coincides with Yaari’s given in a footnote in Diamond (1965).
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Let X = Y∞ and let % be a monotone preference order on X satisfying WP,
and:
Sup-Norm Continuity: For each x ∈ X, the Lower and Upper Contour Sets,
LC(x) = {y ∈ X : x % y} and UC(x) = {y ∈ X : y % x} respectively, are closed with
respect to the sup-norm.
We claim that % satisfies scalar continuity. Let x ∈ X. Then the two sets
UC(x) ∩ C and LC(x) ∩ C are closed in the sup-norm topology since C, the
set of constant sequences in X, is also a closed set in the sup-norm topology.
One can easily verify that the function pi : [0, 1] → C, defined as pi(k) = ke
for every k ∈ [0, 1], is continuous. Then we have A(x) = pi−1(UC(x) ∩ C) and
B(x) = pi−1(LC(x)∩C) showing that A(x) and B(x) are closed sets in [0, 1]. Thus %
satisfies scalar continuity and so % is representable by Proposition 7.
Example 4: Asheim-Mitra-Tungodden Representation on Infinite Utility
Streams
Preference orders on infinite utility streams, which can be represented, ex-
hibit a conflict if the order is required to satisfy certain equity and efficiency
axioms simultaneously. (See Diamond (1965), Basu and Mitra (2003), Hara et al.
(2008), and others).
Seeking a way out of such impossibility results, Asheim et al. (2012) intro-
duce weak versions of efficiency and equity, together with a weak continuity
requirement to establish a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions
for monotone preference orders. In doing this, they first show the existence of
representation for the preference orders by using a continuity condition called
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”Restricted Continuity” which is weaker than the usual sup–norm continuity.
We show here how one can derive the existence of a representation by appeal-
ing to Proposition 7.
Let X = Y∞ and let % be a monotone preference order on X satisfying the
following continuity condition:
Restricted Continuity: For all x, y ∈ X, if x satisfies xt = z for all t > 1, and
the sequence streams {xn}n∈N satisfies limn→∞ supt |xnt − xt| = 0 with, for each n ∈ N,
xn % y (resp. y % xn), then x % y (resp. y % x).
We claim that % satisfies scalar continuity. Let x ∈ X and consider set A(x).
By definition of α(x), there exists a sequence {λs}s∈N in A(x) such that λs → α(x)
as s → ∞. Define xs = λse ∈ X for all s ∈ N. Then by definition of set A(x), we
have xs % x for all s ∈ N. Moreover, as s → ∞, xs → α(x)e in sup-norm metric.
Thus by restricted continuity α(x)e % x and so α(x) ∈ A(x) using definition of
set A(x). Since the order % is monotone, we must have A(x) = [α(x), 1] which is
a closed set in [0, 1]. Following a similar argument for set B(x), one can show
that B(x) = [0, β(x)] which is also a closed set in [0, 1]. Thus % satisfies scalar
continuity and so by Proposition 7, % is a representable preference order.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the relation between scalar continuity and
representability of monotone preference orders in a sequence space. Scalar con-
tinuity is shown to be sufficient for representability of a monotone preference
order (Proposition 7). Generalizing this result, we have shown that a countable
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scalar discontinuity condition ensures representability of a monotone prefer-
ence order (Theorem 4). Although these conditions are not necessary condi-
tions for representability of a monotone preference order, they are very useful
for applications. We have demonstrated this by indicating how some of the
well-known representation results from the literature follow from our represen-
tation results established in Proposition 7 and Theorem 4. Moreover, we have
related the countable scalar discontinuity condition to the well-known order
dense property (Remark 4), which is both necessary and sufficient for repre-
sentability.
2.7 Appendix
In this section, we show that (i) there are monotone preference orders which
satisfy Scalar continuity, but violate Restricted continuity and (therefore) Sup-
norm continuity (Example 5); and (ii) there are monotone preference orders
which satisfy Restricted continuity but violate Sup-norm continuity (Example
6).
2.7.1 Scalar but not Restricted Continuous Monotone Prefer-
ence Order
Example 5: We first construct the example without specifying any dimension
for the sequence space, but we later indicate which case of it we are using, finite
or infinite, when we are considering the relevant conditions for that case.
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Let (qn)n≤M be a sequence for some M ∈ N ∪ {∞} satisfying:
qn > 0 for all n ≤ M and
M∑
n=1
qn = 1 (2.10)




n=1 qnxn if xn > 0 for all n ≤ M
0 otherwise
(2.11)
Note that the sum in the definition of f in (2.11) converges for any x ∈ X and
thus f is well-defined. Define % by:
For all x, y ∈ X, x % y if and only if f (x) ≥ f (y) (2.12)
Then, % is a preference ordering on X, and f is a real-valued representation
of it. Since f is increasing, [that is, for any x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y implies f (x) ≥ f (y) and
x  y implies f (x) > f (y)], by (2.12) we have for any x, y ∈ X, if x ≥ y, then x % y
and if x  y, then x  y and thus, % is monotone and it also satisfies WP.
Scalar Continuity: Let x ∈ X. Then by (2.11) and (2.12), A(x) = [ f (x), 1] and
B(x) = [0, f (x)] which are both closed sets in [0, 1] showing that% satisfies scalar
continuity.
Restricted Continuity: We now show that % does not satisfy restricted
continuity on X = Y∞. Let z = (1 − q1)e and consider the sequence {xn}∞n=1
in X where xn = ( 1n , 1, 1, 1, ...) for all n ∈ N. Then for all n ∈ N, we have
f (xn) = (1 − ( n−1n )q1) ≥ (1 − q1) = f (z) implying by (2.12) that:
xn % z for all n ∈ N (2.13)





→ 0 as n→ ∞ (2.14)
We have by (2.11), f (x) = 0 < (1 − q1) = f (z), and hence by (2.12):
z  x (2.15)
But then (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) imply that % on Y∞ violates the restricted con-
tinuity condition.
Sup-Norm Continuity: Since continuity of an order in sup-norm topology
implies restricted continuity, we infer from the result above that % on X = Y∞
does not satisfy sup-norm continuity.
We now observe that Example 1 also demonstrates that representation of the
preference order in this example cannot be obtained by applying the represen-
tation results of Wold (1943), Diamond (1965), d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002),
and Asheim et al. (2012).
Since in this example, restricted continuity and therefore sup-norm continu-
ity, is violated, the representation results of Asheim et al. (2012) and Diamond
(1965) are not applicable. We verify below that the example also violates Wold’s
continuity condition and Strong Invariance, so that the representation results of
Wold (1943) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) are also not applicable.
Wold: Let % be an order on X = Yn defined in (2.12) for some given n ∈ N.
Let x = e ∈ X, y = (1 − q1)e ∈ X and z = (e − e1) ∈ X. Then, by (2.11), we have
f (x) = 1 > (1 − q1) = f (y) > f (z) = 0 and so by (2.12), x  y  z. Let a ∈ (0, 1)
and define w(a) = ax + (1 − a)z. We have w(a) = (e − (1 − a)e1). By (2.11), we get
f (w(a)) = (1 − (1 − a)q1) > (1 − q1) = f (y) and so by (2.12), w(a)  y. This shows
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that there is no b ∈ (0, 1) such that y  w(b). Thus, the order% does not satify the
condition of Wold.
Strong Invariance: Let % be an order on X = Yn defined in (2.12) for some
given n ∈ N. Let x = (e − e1) ∈ X, y = ((1 − q1)/2)e ∈ X, b = 1 and z = (1/2)e1 ∈ Rn.
Then we have (x + z) = (e − (1/2)e1) ∈ X and (y + z) = ((1 − q1)/2)e + (1/2)e1 ∈ X.
Moreover, by (2.11) f (y) = ((1−q1)/2) > 0 = f (x) and so by (2.12), y  x. Similarly,
by (2.11), f (x + z) = 1 − (1/2)q1 > ((1 − q1)/2) + (1/2)q1 = f (y + z) and so by (2.12),
(x + z)  (y + z) showing that SI is not satisfied.
2.7.2 Restricted but not Sup-norm Continuous Monotone Pref-
erence Order
Example 6: Let X = Y∞ and consider a sequence (qn)n∈N defined as in (2.10). Let




n=1 qnxn if xn > 0 for all n > 1
q1x1 otherwise
(2.16)
Note that the sum in the definition of g in (2.16) converges for any x ∈ X and
thus g is well-defined. Define % by:
For all x, y ∈ X, x % y if and only if g(x) ≥ g(y) (2.17)
Then, % is a preference ordering on X, and g is a real-valued representation
of it. Since g is increasing, [that is, for any x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y implies g(x) ≥ g(y) and
x  y implies g(x) > g(y)], by (2.17) we have for any x, y ∈ X, if x ≥ y, then x % y
and if x  y, then x  y and thus, % is monotone and it also satisfies WP.
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Sup-Norm Continuity: We first show that % does not satisfy sup-norm
continuity on X = Y∞. Let z = (1 − q2)e and consider the sequence {xn}∞n=1
in X where xn = (1, 1n , 1, 1, ...) for all n ∈ N. Then for all n ∈ N, we have
g(xn) = (1 − q2) + (1/n)q2 ≥ 1 − q2 = g(z) implying by (2.17) that:
xn % z for all n ∈ N (2.18)




→ 0 as n→ ∞ (2.19)
We have by (2.10) and (2.16), g(x) = q1 < 1 − q2 = g(z), and hence by (2.17), we
get:
z  x (2.20)
But then (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20) imply that % on Y∞ violates the sup-norm con-
tinuity condition.
Restricted Continuity: We now show that the order% satisfies the restricted
continuity condition. To see this, let y ∈ X and {xn}∞n=1 be a sequence in X with
xn % y for all n ∈ N converging in sup-norm to some x ∈ X such that for all m > 1,
xm = a for some a ∈ [0, 1] (A similar line of argument can be given for the case
where y % xn for all n ∈ N). There are two cases to consider: either (i) there exists
N ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N, xnm > 0 for all m > 1 or (ii) for every N ∈ N there
exists n ≥ N such that xnm(n) = 0 for some m(n) ∈ N with m(n) > 1.
In case (i), by (2.16) and (2.17) we have g(xn) = qxn ≥ g(y) for all n ≥ N. Since
qx is sup-norm continuous, we have qxn → qx as n → ∞ and so qx ≥ g(y). Note
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that since for all m > 1, xm = a for some a ∈ [0, 1], we have g(x) = qx and so we
must have g(x) ≥ g(y) implying that x % y.
In case (ii), we can find a subsequence {xnk}∞k=1 such that xnkmk = 0 for some
mk ∈ N with mk > 1. Thus for all k ∈ N, by (2.16) and (2.17) we have g(xnk) =
q1x
nk
1 ≥ g(y). Since we have xnk → x as k → ∞ in sup-norm, we must have
xnk1 → x1 as k → ∞ and thus q1xnk1 → q1x1 as k → ∞. Therefore, by (2.10), (2.16)
and (2.17) we get g(x) ≥ q1x1 ≥ g(y) inferring that x % y.
Scalar Continuity: Note that since the monotone order % on X = Y∞ sat-
isfies restricted continuity, it must also satisfy scalar continuity following the
discussion given in Example 4 of Section 2.5.
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CHAPTER 3
RATIONAL INATTENTION AND CHOICE OF OPTIMAL INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
In a series of pioneering works, Sims (1998, 2003) introduced a model of infor-
mation acquisition according to which the decision maker (DM) might disre-
gard valuable information to save from the costs. That is, the DM might ra-
tionally choose not to be attentive to all the available information due to her
attention costs among many others. As a result, the DM makes decisions often
with imperfect knowledge leading to many interesting behavioral implications
where a perfectly rational model lacks to predict. Moreover, it is shown in differ-
ent choice contexts that rational inattention is generally applicable unlike many
models of bounded rationality.
Indeed, rational inattention models have been widely used in the literature
to provide plausible answers to some existing questions and new insights on
many others.1 To keep the analysis tractable, however, most of the applied work
assume specific distributions on the state-action set as a way of representing the
available information. As it is argued in detail before, for instance by Sims Sims
(2006), these assumptions are not only restrictive but also hard to defend.2
1Models with rationally inattentive agents have been applied to study inter alia microeco-
nomic foundations for price stickiness, Sims (1998, 2003), investment inertia, Woodford (2009),
coordination failures,Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009)), business-cycle dynamics,Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2010), discrete pricing dynamics, Mateˇjka (2012), and under-diversification of port-
folios,Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). See Veldkamp (2011) for an exhaustive survey
of the rational inattention literature.
2In this regard, most applications of rational inattention theory consider normally dis-
tributed state-signal structures. However, it should be noted that a normally distributed signal
structure need not necessarily be optimal unless a linear-quadratic payoff function is used. See
Sims (2006) and Mateˇjka and McKay (2013).
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As an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, this work considers an ab-
stract choice setting and shows that optimal choices of information can be found
without use of any restrictions on the type of available information. Despite its
mathematical novelty, this result I believe is quite important from an economic
point of view. This is due to the fact that models of rational inattention with a
fully endogenous choice of information should and would lead to a richer set
of behavioral implications and thereby explain more of the observed economic
phenomena.
In specific, this work considers a set of acts available to the DM from which
she eventually makes a choice. Each act gives a payoff to the DM depending
on a finite number of states of the world. The DM, on the other hand, is uncer-
tain about which the true state is but as a Bayesian, she can process available
information to make better choices. To this regard, her information processing
activities, called information channels, are modeled as a distribution over the set
of posteriors consistent with Bayesian updating. Each information channel is
costly and the more informative they become, the more costly they get. There-
fore, the DM needs to make a tradeoff in choosing a channel defining the infor-
mation processing problem of the DM.
Theorem 5 in section 3.2.2 then shows that when the cost of processing in-
formation is linear in channels, a form admitted by the cost functions applied in
the literature, one can obtain an optimal channel with a finite support. Indeed, it
is shown that these optimal posteriors have to be the extreme points of a hyper-
plane supporting the expected net-utility frontier at the prior (see Figure 3.2 in
section 3.3.2). Therefore, solving for an optimal channel amounts to first finding
a finite number of posteriors by appealing to standard optimization techniques
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and then forming a channel in a consistent manner with Bayesian updating.
Moreover, as an application of Theorem 5, a simple buyer-seller problem is
considered in section 3.3. In this problem, which has many applications in real-
life, there is a seller who needs to price a risky project to offer to a potential
buyer who suffers from costly attention. In Proposition 9, the buyer’s unique
optimal channel is obtained with its support and shown to satisfy many intu-
itive properties. For instance, when the offer price is low enough relative to the
cost of information processing, the DM does not process any information at all.
That is, she uses only her prior in accepting the offer. In contrast, when the offer
price is relatively high enough, she rejects the offer without again any use of
information. In between these extreme prices, she processes some information
and depending on the realization of a posterior she either accepts or rejects the
offer.
Proposition 10 then gives the buyer’s acceptance likelihood of the offer. It
is shown that the buyer becomes more likely to accept the offer as the price of
the offer gets lower. Thus, the seller faces a tradeoff between increasing the
revenue he obtains from the offer if accepted and increasing the likelihood of
the buyer accepting the offer. Finally, it is shown in Proposition 11 that, perhaps
surprisingly, the seller’s optimal pricing strategy should be non-monotonic in the
degree of the buyer’s cost of information processing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. This section closes with
a brief discussion of the related literature. Section 2 then formally describes the
choice problem of a rationally inattentive DM and gives a characterization for
the optimal information channels. In section 3, the buyer-seller problem is intro-
duced and then analyzed by first deriving the buyer’s unique optimal choice of
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information and the seller’s optimal pricing strategies on certain domains. Sec-
tion 4 then considers some future research questions in line of the buyer-seller
problem and concludes. The proofs of all results are separately provided in an
Appendix.
Related Literature
In applying models of rational inattention, it is common to focus on the stochas-
tic choice of acts as a result of the DM’s information processing activities. There-
fore, it is common to model the DM’s information choices as choosing joint dis-
tributions between the states and the acts. In this work, however, an alternative
but an equivalent model of information choice is used following the axiomatic
study of de Oliveira et al. (2013). This way of modeling, by understanding that
there are optimal acts for each posterior, focuses on the likelihood of obtaining
each posterior regardless of states rather than obtaining each act in each given
state.
Also, a similar way of modeling was used first by Mateˇjka and McKay (2013)
who build a connection between rational inattention and multinominal logit
models. In specific, they fix a finite set of acts and use the mutual information as
the cost of information processing which together guarantee a finite number of
acts to be chosen and thereby a finite number of corresponding posteriors to be
considered.3 In fact, their setting allows them to consider a discrete optimization
problem and apply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on it to solve for the optimal
acts.
3Mutual information function is a measure of information commonly applied in the literature
which is linear in information channels. See footnote 11 for the definition of mutual information.
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In the current work, however, a more general setting -an arbitrary choice set,
a more general type of cost function- is considered which requires a supporting
hyperplane argument for the solutions of an optimal channel as shown in Theo-
rem 5. This result extends on a solution method used in statistics literature first
given by Chernoff and Reiter (1954) who investigate the optimal solutions of a
bioassay problem.4
Finally, upon the completion of this work I got aware of a closely related
study by Caplin and Dean (2013). In a similar choice setting to the one in this
work, Caplin and Dean (2013) investigate the behavioral implications of ratio-
nal inattention when the cost function is taken as the mutual information. In
characterizing the solutions of optimal acts, they use a similar hyperplane argu-
ment to the one given in Theorem 5. The main difference between their solution
result and Theorem 5 is that they only allow information channels with a finite
support whereas this work considers any feasible channel and shows that an
optimal channel with a finite support is always attainable when the state space
is finite. In fact, it is possible also to find optimal channels with a support con-
sisting of a number posteriors more than the number of states (see Remark 8 in
section 3.2.2).
3.2 Choice Problem
In this section, I first introduce the choice problem of a Bayesian DM for whom
information processing is costly and then I give a characterization for an optimal
4For the statement of the bioassay problem and its solutions, see Chernoff and Reiter (1954),
Isaacson and Rubin (1954), Rustaghi (1957) and the related literature therein.
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choice of information when the cost function is linear.5
3.2.1 Description of the Model
Let Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn} be a finite state space for some n ∈ N+ representing the un-
certainty faced by the DM. Let P = ∆(Ω) denote the set of probability measures
over state space Ω. The DM’s prior belief is denoted by p¯ ∈ P assumed to have
a full support. There is a set of consequences, denoted by X, from which the DM
obtains utility according to some real-valued function u : X → R.
Let F denote the set of all acts (or actions), that is, the set of all functions f
mapping Ω into X. As a Bayesian, the DM values each act f ∈ F for each given
posterior p ∈ P according to the standard expected utility formula:
Up( f ) =
∫
Ω
u( f (ω)) p(dω) (3.1)
A subset of acts A ⊂ F, called an admissible choice set, satisfying for each
posterior p ∈ P arg max
f∈A
Up( f ) , ∅ is assumed to be available to the DM from
which she needs to make a choice of an act.
It is assumed that the DM has access to information -via various sources-
about the true state ωi ∈ Ω which can be used to make better choices. Formally,
a standard approach in modeling information sources in terms of a distribu-
tion over posteriors, called information channels, will be used [See (Gollier, 2004,
Chapter 24)].
5The notations and definitions given in this section mainly follow de Oliveira et al. (2013).
For completeness of the discussions I provide them also here.
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Information Channels
Let the set of probability measures over P be denoted by ∆(P) which is convex
and compact in the topology of convergence in distribution.6




p(ω) pi(dp) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Each channel specifies a set of posteriors in P with corresponding probabilities
consistent with updating the prior p¯ ∈ P via Bayes rule.7 Let Π(p¯) denote the set
of channels which is a convex and closed subset of ∆(P).
The notion to be used to compare channels in terms of their informativeness
is the [Blackwell (1953)] order.
The Blackwell Order
Definition 7 Let pi and ρ be a pair of channels. Then pi is called to be more informa-






for each convex function ϕ : P→ R.
The Blackwell order intuitively requires a unanimous agreement on the com-
parative usefulness of channels. Given a choice set A, for instance, any Bayesian
6Convexity of ∆(P) is clear. See Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.505-506 for the compactness
of it.
7Indeed a channel is a summary of information processing activities of a DM focusing on the
posteriors.
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decision maker should obtain more expected utility with channel pi than channel
ρ if pi is more informative than ρ.8
Ideally, the DM would like to improve her choices by using the most in-
formative channels. Following Sims (2003), however, the DM is assumed to
have rationally inattentive preferences towards information. That is, the DM
incurs a cost of processing information possibly due to her scarce attention. I
parametrize the attention scarcity of the DM by a cost function defined as fol-
lows:9
Information Cost Function
Definition 8 Given a prior p¯ ∈ P, a function c : Π( p¯)→ R+ is called an information
cost function if it is lower semi-continuous and satisfies the following three properties:
(i) Grounded: c(pi) = 0 if pi( p¯) = 1.
(ii) Convex: c(αpi + (1 − α)ρ) ≤ αc(pi) + (1 − α)c(ρ) if pi, ρ ∈ Π( p¯) and α ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Monotone: c(pi) ≥ c(ρ) if pi, ρ ∈ Π( p¯) such that piD ρ.
Lower semi-continuity and convexity are standard conditions of a cost function
useful for optimization purposes.10 Groundedness is a normalization which
invokes the intuitive condition that if a channel is uninformative with respect to
a prior, then it is worth no attention which of course should be free. On the other
8For equivalent definitions of Blackwell order, see Kihlstrom (1984), pg.13-31.
9For an axiomatic foundation of rationally inattentive preferences and for discussions of gen-
eral properties of an information cost function, see de Oliveira et al. (2013).
10Indeed, it follows from Theorem 5.43 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) that an information
cost function c is continuous on each open convex subset of Π( p¯).
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hand, monotonicity ensures that more information requires more attention and
paying more attention should be more costly.
In light of above notions, I can now summarize the general choice problem
of interest. To ease the notation, let ϕuA(p) denote the utility payoff of the best act
in A when the posterior is p ∈ P. That is:
ϕuA(p) = maxf∈A
Up( f ), ∀p ∈ P (3.2)
Choice Problem Under Rational Inattention
Definition 9 A choice problem consists of a tuple C=(A, u, p¯, c) such that the DM








where u : X → R is a utility function, p¯ ∈ P is a prior belief with full support,
c : Π( p¯)→ R+ is an information cost function and A ⊂ F is an admissible choice
set.
In (3.3), the function ϕuA(p) gives the value of posterior p ∈ P when the choice
set is A. The expression within square brackets then corresponds to the expected
payoff of a channel pi ∈ Π(p¯) less the cost of it which is equal to the net value of
channel pi. As ϕuA(p) is convex, a more informative channel has a higher expected
payoff while it also costs more. Taking this into account, the outer maximization
finally corresponds to the optimal choice of a channel with the highest value
under the choice set A.
From an ex-ante point of view, clearly the model in (3.3) leads to a stochastic
choice of an act. This is due to the fact that the DM rationally chooses an act
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only after the realization of a posterior p ∈ P which in turn happens randomly
governed by a chosen channel. Moreover, it is clear that solutions of both max-
imizations in (3.2) and (3.3) depend on each other. In other words, what you
learn affects what actions you would take and what actions you could take af-
fects what you would learn. Thus, finding a solution to the problem in (3.3)
could be quite hard in general and for the sake of tractability, one might need to
put some restrictions on the above model.
As I will show in what follows, however, one does not need any restrictions
on the type of available information when a linear cost function -such as the
mutual information function- is used. Before proceeding to the next section,
I now first confirm the existence of an optimal channel for the model in (3.3)
showing that the choice problem in definition 9 is well-defined.
Proposition 8 There exists an optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯) for a given choice problem C
in (3.3). Moreover, when the cost function c is strictly convex, the optimal channel has
to be unique.
3.2.2 Characterization of a Solution
I now consider the optimal solutions of a channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯) for the model in
(3.3) when the cost function is linear in channels; that is, when the cost function






for some convex posterior cost function cˆ : P→ R+ such that cˆ( p¯) = 0.11
It will be shown that one can find in this case a finite set of posteriors which
would together form the support of an optimal channel. Before proceeding to
this characterization result, some preliminary discussions would be quite useful
to put. To this regard, let C be a choice problem with a cost function c satisfying
condition (3.4) for some posterior cost cˆ : P → R+ and let Vu,cˆA : P → R denote
the net-value of each posterior defined as follows:
Vu,cˆA (p) = ϕ
u
A(p) − cˆ(p) (3.5)








Remark 6 The objective function in (3.6) is linear in pi and therefore it is continuous.
Then it immediately follows from Bauer’s maximum principle 12 that there must exist
a maximizer pi∗ for the problem in (3.6), possibly non-unique, which is an extreme point
of the set Π( p¯); that is, a point which can not be written as a strict convex combination of
two distinct points in Π(p¯). But then, it is easy to see that by Carathodory’s theorem
any such extreme point of Π(p¯) must have a support with at most n = |Ω| posteriors in
it.
Note that the linearity of the objective function in pi is essential to be able to ap-
11Note that the cost function c in (3.4) is well-defined in the sense that it satisfies all the prop-
erties required of an information cost function given in definition 8. Indeed, many applications
of rational inattention in the literature use mutual information as the cost function which is sep-
arable in the sense of (3.4). More specifically, for the mutual information function cˆ(p) is taken
as the relative entropy function R(p‖p¯). See Cover and Thomas (2006).
12See Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.298-299 for the Bauer maximum principle.
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ply the Bauer maximum principle in Remark 6. On the other hand, the current
setting allows one to say more about optimal solutions of the problem in (3.6)
by appealing to a supporting hyperplane argument.













Notice that the set S = L(∆(P)) is a convex subset of Rn since ∆(P) is convex and
linearity of L preserves convexity. In fact, S is the convex hull of the graph of
function Vu,cˆA (see Figure 3.2 for an illustration). Moreover, for any optimal chan-
nel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯), L(pi∗) is a boundary point of S as its last coordinate is maximized
while other coordinates are fixed. Therefore, there must be some hyperplane H
associated with a vector λ ∈ Rn−1 supporting S at L(pi∗) such that
L(pi) · (λ, 1) ≤ L(pi∗) · (λ, 1), ∀pi ∈ ∆(P) (3.8)
But then, since H has an n − 1 dimension, L(pi∗) can be written as a convex com-
bination of at most n extreme points of S belonging to H. These extreme points,
on the other hand, necessarily must be of the form L(piq) for some q ∈ P where
piq ∈ ∆(P) denotes a point mass distribution defined as:
piq(p) =

1 if p = q
0 if p , q
(3.9)
I now state the above result formally. Let supp(pi) denote the support of a channel
pi ∈ Π( p¯) and pip ∈ ∆(P) denote the point mass distribution for some p ∈ P as
defined in (3.9).
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Theorem 5 Let C be a choice problem with a linear cost function c. Then, there exists
an optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯) with | supp(pi∗)| ≤ n such that for all q ∈ supp(pi∗)
(i) piq ∈ arg max
pi∈∆(P)
[L(pi) · (λ, 1)] for some λ ∈ Rn−1 and
(ii) L(piq) is an extreme point of the set S = L(∆(P))
where L : ∆(P)→ Rn is defined as in (3.7).
A few remarks are in order.13
Remark 7 Clearly, condition (i) in Theorem 5 is satisfied by any optimal channel pi∗ ∈
Π( p¯) and therefore it holds for all p ∈ supp(pi∗) for any optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯).
Otherwise, pi∗ could not satisfy condition (i).
Remark 8 In general, one can find an optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯) such that | supp(pi∗)| >
n or condition (ii) fails for some p ∈ supp(pi∗). In contrast, when condition (ii) is satisfied
by an optimal channel, then the unique optimal channel must be pip¯.
It follows from Remark 7 that finding an optimal channel is a two-step process.
First, one needs to obtain a set of posteriors q ∈ P satisfying condition (i) in
Theorem 5 for some vector λ ∈ Rn−1 and then find the appropriate weights pi∗(q)
on each such q so that pi∗ ∈ Π(p¯). Moreover, Theorem 5 guarantees that one can
find a set of such posteriors with at most n elements in it.
In the next section, I will apply this result in a buyer-seller problem to solve
for the buyer’s unique optimal channel.
13In deriving Theorem 5, any choice set A is permitted as long as the choice problem C is well-
defined. Mateˇjka and McKay (2013), on the other hand, use a finite choice set with the mutual
information as the cost of information while allowing for an arbitrary state space. In this regard,
our works can be seen complementary.
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3.3 Application: Pricing a Risky Project
In this section, I investigate a model of pricing a risky project where the seller
of the project faces with a potential buyer who is rationally inattentive. The ob-
ject of interest is to understand how rational inattention affects optimal pricing.
To see this effect, I will first analyze the buyer’s problem to derive her optimal
behavior against each offer price and then show how the buyer’s cost of infor-
mation processing changes the seller’s optimal prices. I now first describe the
pricing problem and then analyze it in Section 3.2.
3.3.1 Description of the Pricing Problem
I consider a principal-agent setting where a risk-neutral seller s (the principal)
owns a risky project and wants to sell (or rent) it to a risk-neutral buyer b (the
agent) with an initial wealth of W∈ R.14 The outcome of the project depends on
the state of the world and for simplicity, I shall assume that the set of states Ω
has only two elements ωL and ωH denoting respectively the low and the high
states. Low and high state outcomes of the project are denoted by L ∈ R and
H ∈ R respectively and the cost of implementing the project by C ∈ R+which are
assumed to satisfy L < C < H < W.15
Let P = ∆(Ω) denote the set of probability measures over Ω and let pL and
14For instance, the risky project could be seen as a house that a landlord wants to lease or
a land that the owner wants to rent it to a sharecropper. It could be seen as a patent that an
entrepreneur wants to sell, a product that the customer is uncertain about the quality of it or an
applicant whose fit in the job is uncertain. In fact, one can extend the list of examples of this
model quite substantially.
15The assumption on the buyer’s wealth W is placed to abstract from any wealth effects. Also,
the seller is assumed to have not enough wealth or simply have no interest to take up the project.
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pH denote in short the probabilities p(ωL) and p(ωH) respectively for any p ∈ P.
The buyer is assumed to have a prior belief p¯ ∈ P such that p¯L, p¯H ∈ (0, 1).16 I
also assume that the expected payoff of the project H − p¯L(H − L), denoted by E,
is strictly greater than the execution cost C; that is, E > C. Moreover, the buyer
is rationally inattentive with a linear cost function cθ : Π(p¯)→ R+ defined for all





where θ > 0 is a cost parameter measuring the degree of attentiveness and
cˆ(p) = ( p¯L − pL)2 =
∫
Ω
(p¯ω − pω)2 p(dω)
for all p ∈ P. Note that the cost function cθ in (3.10) satisfies the properties
required in definition (8).17 Also note that as parameter θ gets bigger, informa-
tion processing becomes more costly or in other words the buyer becomes less
attentive.
Finally, it is assumed that all parameters of the model is common knowledge.
That is to say, the seller knows what the buyer’s prior p¯ is, what her information
cost function cθ is and both the seller and the buyer agree on all other parameters
of the model.
16It is assumed for simplicity that the seller also has the same prior to abstract from any
information asymmetry and therefore any strategic interaction between the buyer and the seller.
17This specific choice of the cost function is made for brevity. The results obtained in this
work can also be derived with more common cost functions such as the mutual information.
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3.3.2 Analysis of the Pricing Problem
The order of decisions is as follows: First the seller decides on an offer price R ≥
0 to ask for the risky project to the buyer. Facing with a price R, the buyer then
decides whether to obtain information or not before taking any action: either
accepting or rejecting the offer. If the buyer decides to accept the offer, she pays
the seller the offer price R, incurs the cost of executing the project C and finally
obtains a payoff of L or H depending on the state of the world. If, on the other
hand, she decides not to take the offer, then no transaction occurs between the
buyer and the seller. In this case, the seller does not obtain any revenue and the
buyer keeps her wealth W.18 I now formally analyze the buyer and the seller
problem starting from the former.
Buyer’s Problem
As the buyer is risk neutral, I first normalize her utility function such that ub(x) =
x for any x ∈ R. Given an offer price R, the buyer first needs to decide whether to
obtain information or not before making a choice of an act: accepting or declining
the offer denoted by aR and d respectively. If she chooses act aR, her payoff
would be (L−R) + (W −C) when the state is low and (H −R) + (W −C) when it is
high. On the other hand, by choosing act d she can only obtain a constant payoff
at her initial wealth W. Thus, the buyer’s choice problem can be summarized
with the tuple CR,θ = (AR, ub, p¯, cθ) where
AR = {aR, d} (3.11)
18Note that the seller gives the buyer an option of accepting or declining the offer with or
without obtaining information. An alternative pricing scheme, in fact, could also value this
option. See section 3.4 for more on this.
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It is clear that for a given posterior p ∈ P, the buyer will accept an offer R if and
only if its expected benefit, Ep = [H − pL(H − L)] is more than its cost R+C. That
is, the offer will be accepted when p ∈ P is such that pL ≤ H−R−CH−L . Thus for a








W + Ep − (R +C) if pL ≤ H−R−CH−L
W if pL > H−R−CH−L
(3.12)
Now, the buyer’s objective is to use a channel for the problem CR,θ optimizing









where for all p ∈ P
Vθ,cˆAR (p) = ϕAR(p) − θcˆ(p)
denotes the net-value of each posterior. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the value
ϕAR(p), cost cˆ(p), and net-value V
θ,cˆ
AR
(p) of each posterior p ∈ P for some given
offer R and parameter θ. Figure 3.2 then shows the convex hull of the graph of
function Vθ,cˆAR (p) and the optimal posteriors for the problem in (3.13).
By Proposition 8 an optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π(p¯) exists and by Theorem 5 it can
be uniquely defined with a support of at most two points. Indeed, Proposition
9 below lists the support of an optimal channel for all pairs of admissible offer








Figure 3.1: A sketch of value, cost














Figure 3.2: Convex hull of
posterior/net-values and opti-
mal posteriors .





H −C − R
if R ∈ [0,max{H+L2 −C, 0})







if R ∈ [0,max{E+L2 −C, 0})







if R ∈ (E −C, E+H2 −C]
if R ∈ [E+H2 −C,H −C)
θ4(R) =

C + R − L
(H−L)2
4(H−C−R)
if R ∈ [0,max{H+L2 −C, 0})




I1 = epi θ2 I4 = epi θ1 ∩ hypS θ3 ∩ hyp θ4
I2 = epi θ1 ∩ [hypS θ2 ∪ hypS θ3] ∩ epi θ4 I5 = hyp θ1 ∩ hyp θ4
I3 = hyp θ1 ∩ hypS θ2 ∩ epi θ4 I6 = epi θ3 ∪ epiS θ5
(3.15)
where epi, epiS , hyp and hypS denote the epigraph, strict epigraph, hypograph
and strict hypograph of a function respectively. Note that the sets, I1 to I6 de-
fined in (3.15) partition the region [0,∞)× (0,∞) into six sub-regions as depicted













Figure 3.3: Sub-regions and motion of optimal price.
I am now ready to state the proposition giving a full characterization of the
unique optimal channel for the problem CR,θ with its support.
Proposition 9 Let CR,θ be the buyer’s problem for some given cost parameter θ > 0
and offer price R ≥ 0. Then the unique optimal channel pi∗R,θ ∈ Π( p¯) has its support as
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if (R, θ) ∈ I1 ∪ I6
if (R, θ) ∈ I2
if (R, θ) ∈ I3
if (R, θ) ∈ I4
if (R, θ) ∈ I5
The support given in Proposition 9 for each (R, θ) uniquely identifies an optimal
channel due to the fact that the support has only at most two posteriors in it
and therefore can be mixed in only one way to obtain the prior. These unique
weights on each posterior then necessarily defines the optimal channel.
Now, if the support has only the prior p¯ as its element, the buyer does not
process any information and therefore deterministically accepts or rejects the
offer depending on how good the offer is. In fact it follows from (3.12) that when
(R, θ) ∈ I1, that is when the offer is relatively cheap enough, the buyer accepts
the offer as she has p¯L ≤ H−C−RH−L in this case and in contrast when (R, θ) ∈ I6, that
is when the offer is relatively expensive enough, she rejects the offer since then
p¯L > H−C−RH−L .
On the other hand, when the support has two distinct points pR,θand qR,θ in it,
the buyer processes some information and accepts or rejects the offer depending
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on the stochastic realization of a posterior. Indeed, she accepts the offer when
the realized posterior is pR,θ since pR,θL ≤ H−C−RH−L when (R, θ) < I1∪ I6 and rejects the
offer when qR,θ is realized since qR,θL >
H−C−R
H−L when (R, θ) < I1 ∪ I6.
The following proposition summarizes above discussion and gives the ac-
ceptance likelihood pia(R, θ) ∈ [0, 1] of an offer R ≥ 0 when the buyer has a cost
parameter θ > 0. I will particularly use this result when the seller’s problem is
considered in the next section.
Proposition 10 Let CR,θ be the buyer’s problem for some given cost parameter θ > 0
and offer price R ≥ 0 and let {pR,θ, qR,θ} be the support of the unique optimal channel
pi∗R,θ. Then the probability of accepting the offer pia(R, θ) ∈ [0, 1] can be given as follows:
pia(R, θ) =

1 if (R, θ) ∈ I1
qR,θL − p¯L
qR,θL −pR,θL
∈ (0, 1) if (R, θ) ∈ I2 ∪ I3 ∪ I4 ∪ I5
0 if (R, θ) ∈ I6
(3.16)
Remark 9 For a given θ, the acceptance likelihood pia(R, θ) is non-increasing in R. That
is, the buyer becomes less likely to accept an offer as the price of the offer gets higher.
This intuitive result holds due to the fact that the buyer would like to accept an offer
only when she is certain enough that the project brings her a high payoff. That is, only
when pL ≤ H−R−CH−L as given in (3.12). But as R gets bigger, the right hand side of this
inequality becomes smaller and thus the likelihood of the posterior at which the offer is
accepted, pR,θ, becomes lower.
As just noted in Remark 9 above, the seller may obtain more revenue by risking
the acceptance of the offer. Thus, for the seller there is a certain tradeoff between
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the revenue of an offer and the likelihood of its acceptance. In the following sec-
tion, how this tradeoff is affected as the buyer’s cost of processing information
changes will be investigated in more detail.
Seller’s Problem
As is the seller also risk-neutral, I first normalize and take his payoff function as
us(x) = x for any x ∈ R. Now, given a cost parameter θ > 0, the objective of the
seller is to set a price R ≥ 0 giving him the highest expected payoff. That is, he
needs to maximize his expected revenue given as:
max
R≥0
pia(R, θ) × R (3.17)
where pia(R, θ) is the probability of the buyer accepting the offer defined as in
(3.16).
Remark 10 By using Propositions 9 and 10, one can easily verify that the acceptance
likelihood of an offer pia(R, θ) is continuous in R for any given θ and so is the objective
function in (3.17). Moreover, it is clear that an optimal offer price R can not be higher
than H − C since otherwise the seller can not obtain any revenue whereas he could
earn some for an offer price R ∈ [0,H − C]. Thus, one can restrict the domain of the
maximization in (3.17) to the interval [0,H − C] implying that the seller’s problem in
(3.17) has a solution and so it is well-defined.
Now, the subject of interest is to understand how these optimal prices R∗(θ)
are affected by the changes in the buyer’s cost parameter θ. Should the seller
increase the ask price R as the buyer becomes more attentive or should he de-
crease it? The following proposition shows that, perhaps surprisingly, the opti-
mal price R∗(θ) should be non-monotonic in the cost parameter θ.
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Proposition 11 Let the seller’s problem be given as in (3.17) for some cost parameter




E −C − (H−L)24θ when θ > θ′
H −C − θ when θ < θ′′
Note that the optimal price R∗(θ) is monotonically decreasing on the interval
(0, θ′′) and increasing on θ ∈ (θ′,∞) as also depicted in Figure 3.3 above. That
is to say, when the buyer is sufficiently attentive (θ < θ′′), it is optimal for the
seller to increase the price as θ gets smaller. On the other hand, when the buyer
is sufficiently inattentive (θ > θ′), the seller finds it optimal to decrease the price
as θ gets smaller. The reason for this behavior is that when θ < θ′′, benefit
of increasing the price is more than cost of risking the offer’s acceptance . In
contrast, when θ > θ′, benefit of not risking the offer’s acceptance outweighs
cost of loosing payoff by decreasing the price .
It is worth noting that as θ approaches to∞, the optimal price R∗(θ) increases
towards E −C which is the optimal price to offer when the buyer can not obtain
information about the true state. Also, when θ tends to 0, the optimal price R∗(θ)
increases towards H − C which is the optimal price to ask for if the buyer can
always perfectly identify the true state.
Finally, note that Proposition 11 gives a partial characterization for the
seller’s optimal price as it is silent on the nature of R∗(θ) over the interval [θ′′, θ′].
This is due to the fact that many possibilities arise and to focus on a particu-
lar behavior one needs to invoke further assumptions on the parameters of the
model. This task will be taken up in future research as it is discussed in more
detail in the next section.
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3.4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Rational inattention theory has found use in my different choice settings most
notably on macroeconomic and finance problems. To this date, however, its
applicability has been relied on strong assumptions on the parameters of re-
spective models, especially on the type of available information. I believe the
results obtained in section 2 of this work might shed some light on the theory
and applications of rational inattention which hopefully would flourish more
research in particular stemming from microeconomics based questions.
To this regard, a simple buyer-seller problem is considered in section 3 to
demonstrate the use of Theorem 5. Moreover, an interesting feature of rational
inattention on the optimal pricing of the risky project is shown. Specifically, I
found that the optimal price R∗(θ) should be non-monotonic in the cost param-
eter θ which measures the attentiveness of the buyer. In this simple model, I
treated θ as an exogenous parameter as part of the definition of the buyer about
which the seller is perfectly knowledgeable. Indeed, it is straightforward to ex-
tend the model to the case where the seller has some uncertainty about the cost
parameter θ.
On the other hand, one might also see parameter θ as a description of the
economic stage where the buyer and the seller are in interaction. In specific, θ
might be viewed as measuring how hard or easy to transmit information from a
source to the buyer. For instance, the number of the Internet providers, wireless
phone companies, TV channels and such might determine the degree of this
parameter. An interesting exercise in this setting then would be to look for the
optimal level of θ if the goal is to achieve a maximum social welfare according to
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some welfare function. Or parameter θ could be taken as a costly advertisement
intensity controlled by the seller affecting how easy or hard to obtain informa-
tion about the risky project. Then, in this setting one might look for the seller’s
optimal levels of price R∗ and parameter θ∗.
Finally, in this simple model it is implicitly assumed that the seller forgoes
the value of providing an option to the seller. That is, the option of being able
to study and accept the offer conditional on the posterior knowledge. In an
alternative setting, the seller could offer a scheme of prices (r,R) where r ≥ 0
denotes the price of being able to buy the project later at a price not more than
R ≥ 0. It is easy to see that when the buyer is sufficiently inattentive, then it
would not matter for the seller whether to put an option price or not. However,
this might not necessarily be the case when the buyer is sufficiently attentive as
then she accepts the offer in a stochastic manner. It would be interesting to see in
that case whether a unique optimal price scheme can be obtained or not. And if
the answer is yes, then one can ask for the effects of parameter θ on these prices.
If not, then also it would be interesting to see how these prices are related to
each other as the parameter θ varies. I postpone the quest for answers of these
and related questions to future research.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8:
Consider the expression in (3.3) for a given choice problem C. Let ϕ : Π( p¯) → R





Clearly, the function ϕ is linear in pi and therefore continuous. Also, it is given
that the cost function c : Π( p¯) → R in (3.3) is weakly lower semi-continuous.
Thus, the function [ϕ − c] : Π( p¯) → R defined as [ϕ − c](pi) = ϕ(pi) − c(pi) for all




[ϕ − c](pi) (3.18)
Since the objective function in (3.18) is upper semi-continuous and its domain
Π( p¯) is weakly compact, a maximum must be achieved.19 Moreover, when the
cost function c is strictly convex, then the objective function [ϕ − c] is strictly
concave and so the optimal channel must be unique.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Let C be a choice problem with a linear cost function c and let L : ∆(P)→ Rn be a
function defined for all pi ∈ ∆(P) as in (3.7). Then, the set S = L(∆(P)) is a compact
convex subset ofRn since L is a linear function and thus preserves convexity and
compactness. As it is argued in the text, the point L(pi∗) is a boundary point of
S for any optimal channel pi∗ ∈ Π( p¯). Therefore, there must be some hyperplane
19See Aliprantis and Border Aliprantis and Border (2006), Theorem 2.43.
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Hλ ⊂ Rn associated with a vector λ ∈ Rn−1 supporting S at L(pi∗).20 That is,
Hλ = {h ∈ Rn : h · (λ, 1) = L(pi∗) · (λ, 1)} for some λ ∈ Rn−1 such that for any
pi ∈ ∆(P) the inequality in (3.8) holds. In particular, (3.8) holds with equality for
any L(pi) ∈ Hλ ∩ S . Also note that Hλ is a closed convex set and therefore Hλ ∩ S
must be a compact convex set.
But then, since Hλ∩S has an n−1 dimension, by Minkowski-Carathodory the-
orem L(pi∗) can be written as a convex combination of at most n extreme points
of S belonging to Hλ.21 Moreover, these extreme points necessarily must be of
the form L(piq) for some q ∈ P where piq ∈ ∆(P) is a point distribution defined as
in (3.9). Then, clearly conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 5 are satisfied for each
q ∈ P.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Let CR,θ be the buyer’s problem defined in (3.11) for some given cost parameter
θ > 0 and offer price R ≥ 0. By Proposition 8, there exists an optimal channel
pi∗R,θ ∈ Π( p¯) solving the expression in (3.13). Moreover, by Theorem 5 optimal
channels can have at most two points in their support. I now want to show that
the unique optimal channel can be obtained by identifying its support.






and moreover for some p ∈ P, the inequality in (3.19) is strict. Thus, when
(R, θ) ∈ epiS θ5 the unique optimal channel trivially has support supp(pi∗R,θ) = {p¯}
20See Aliprantis and Border (2006) for the general statement of the supporting hyperplane
theorem.
21See Simon Simon (2011), theorem 8.11.
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where epiS θ5 is defined as in (3.15). Hence, for the remainder of the proof I
consider the case where R ∈ [0,H −C).
Now define the function VR : P → R as in (3.5) for the buyer’s problem CR,θ




(Ex − R) + (W −C) − θ(p¯L − x)2
W − θ(p¯L − x)2
if x ≤ xR
if x > xR
where Ex = H − x(H − L) and xR = H−C−RH−L .
Note that, 0 < xR < 1 by the fact that L < C + R < H. Moreover, it can be
easily seen that V(x) is piecewise differentiable over [0, 1] except at x = xR and is
strictly concave in x over each of its sub-domains [0, xR) and (xR, 1].22
Now, from the proof of Theorem 5 it follows that finding an optimal chan-






V(x) pi(dx)) ∈ R2} with the first coordinate fixed at p¯L and
second coordinate maximized. Also it follows that such a point s∗ is a boundary
point of set S and so can be written as a convex combination of at most two ex-
treme points of S which lie on the same line supporting S at point s∗. Therefore,
there exist some λ ∈ R for s∗ such that for all (s1, s2) ∈ S
λs1 + s2 ≤ λp¯L + s∗2 (3.20)
and if s∗ is not an extreme point itself, then there must exist some x∗ ∈
[0, min{ p¯L, xR}) and y∗ ∈ (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1] such that (x∗,V(x∗)) and (y∗,V(y∗)) are
extreme points of set S and satisfy (3.20) with equality. Note that any ex-
treme point of S must have the form as (z,V(z)) for some z ∈ [0, 1] and also
22Since V is semi-differentiable at points x = 0 and x = 1, I consider the right and left deriva-
tives at these points respectively.
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due to the strict concavity of V on its sub-domains, there can not be any
z∗ ∈ [min{ p¯L, xR},max{ p¯L, xR}] where (z∗,V(z∗)) is an extreme point of S satisfy-
ing (3.20) with equality unless s∗ is an extreme point.
Now I want to find when s∗ is not an extreme point and thus can be written
as a convex combination of two extreme points (x∗,V(x∗)) and (y∗,V(y∗)). Each
such extreme point (z,V(z)) ∈ S must satisfy (3.20) with equality or in other
words maximizes λz + V(z). But since V is strictly concave and differentiable
respectively on the intervals [0, min{ p¯L, xR}) and (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1], the following
first order conditions are necessary and sufficient to find optimal x∗and y∗ in
terms of λ:
V ′(z) + λ ≤ 0 if z = 0
V ′(z) + λ = 0 if z , 0 or 1
V ′(z) + λ ≥ 0 if z = 1
And in conjunction with the equality V(x∗) + λx∗ = V(y∗) + λy∗ that they
must satisfy, optimal x∗and y∗ can be found free of λ. As noted above there
are several cases to consider: (i) x∗ ∈ (0,min{p¯L, xR}) and y∗ ∈ (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1),
(ii)x∗ ∈ (0,min{ p¯L, xR}) and y∗ = 1, (iii) x∗ = 0 and y∗ ∈ (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1) and (iv)
x∗ = 0 and y∗ = 1.
Case (i): In this case, the optimality conditions are as follows:
V(x∗) + λx∗ = V(y∗) + λy∗
V ′(x∗) + λ = 0 = V ′(y∗) + λ
(3.21)
From conditions in (3.21), I obtain:
x∗ = H−C−RH−L − H−L4θ




and by checking whether x∗ ∈ (0,min{ p¯L, xR}) and y∗ ∈ (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1), I derive
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that (R, θ) ∈ I2 where I2 is defined in (3.15). Therefore, when (R, θ) ∈ I2,
supp(pi∗R,θ) = {(x∗, 1 − x∗), (y∗, 1 − y∗)}where x∗, y∗ are given in (3.22).
Case (ii): In this case, the optimality conditions are as follows:
V(x∗) + λx∗ = V(1) + λ
V ′(x∗) + λ = 0 ≤ V ′(1) + λ
(3.23)
From conditions in (3.23), I obtain:





and by checking the domain condition x∗ ∈ (0,min{ p¯L, xR}), I derive that (R, θ) ∈ I3
where I3 is defined in (3.15). Therefore, when (R, θ) ∈ I3, the support is
supp(pi∗R,θ) = {(x∗, 1 − x∗), (1, 0)}where x∗ is given in (3.24).
Case (iii): In this case, the optimality conditions are as follows:
V(0) = V(y∗) + λy∗
V ′(0) + λ ≤ 0 = V ′(y∗) + λ
(3.25)






and by checking the domain condition y∗ ∈ (max{ p¯L, xR}, 1), I obtain that (R, θ) ∈
I4 where I4 is defined in (3.15). Thus, when (R, θ) ∈ I4 the support is supp(pi∗R,θ) =
{(0, 1), (y∗, 1 − y∗)}where y∗ is given in (3.26).
Case (iv): In this case, the optimality conditions are as follows:
V(0) = V(1) + λ
V ′(0) + λ ≤ 0 ≤ V ′(1) + λ
(3.27)
From conditions in (3.27), I obtain that (R, θ) ∈ I5 where I5 is defined in (3.15).
Thus, when (R, θ) ∈ I5 the support is supp(pi∗R,θ) = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
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From above derivations, one can conclude that when (R, θ) ∈ epi θ2 ∪ epi θ3
which are defined in (3.15), s∗ can not be written as a convex combination of
two extreme points satisfying (3.20) and thus s∗ must be equal to ( p¯L,V(p¯L)) as
an extreme point of S . That is to say, when (R, θ) ∈ epi θ2 ∪ epi θ3, one have
supp(pi∗R,θ) = { p¯}.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Let CR,θ be the buyer’s problem defined in (3.11) for some given cost parameter
θ > 0 and offer price R ≥ 0. For any posterior p ∈ P, the buyer accepts the offer
if and only if (H −R)− pL(H − L) + (W −C) ≥ W. That is, she chooses act aR if and
only if she has a posterior p ∈ P satisfying
pL ≤ H − R −CH − L = xR (3.28)
Now let (R, θ) ∈ I2∪I3∪I4∪I5. From Proposition 9, the optimal channel pi∗R,θ ∈ Π( p¯)
for the problem (AR, ub, p¯, cθ) has its support as supp(pi∗R,θ) = {pR,θ, qR,θ} ⊂ P where
pR,θL < min{ p¯L, xR} and qR,θL > max{ p¯L, xR} . Thus, in this case the buyer accepts
the offer only when she has the posterior pR,θ by condition (3.28). Also from the
definition of a channel, it must be the case that pi∗R,θ(p
R,θ)pR,θL + (1 − pi∗R,θ(pR,θ))qR,θL =






Now let (R, θ) ∈ I1. From Proposition 9, the buyer’s optimal channel has a sup-
port as supp(pi∗R,θ) = {p¯}. That is, she uses only her prior in making the choice of
an act. From the definition of I1 given in (3.15), I get R < E − C. More explicitly,
R < H −C − p¯L(H − L) and so by condition (3.28) the buyer accepts the offer with
probability 1.
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Now let (R, θ) ∈ I6. By the proof of Proposition 9, the support is supp(pi∗R,θ) =
{ p¯} when (R, θ) ∈ epiS θ5 and she does not accept the offer in this case. Finally,
consider the case (R, θ) ∈ epi θ3 . Once again, from Proposition 9 it follows that
supp(pi∗R,θ) = { p¯}. In this case, I have R > E −C and so p¯L > xR. Thus, by condition
(3.28) the buyer rejects the offer with probability 1.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Let the seller’s problem be defined as in (3.17) for some given cost parameter
θ > 0. By Remark 10, an optimal price R∗(θ) for the seller’s problem must be
in [0, H − C]. Moreover, the optimal price R∗(θ) can be uniquely given as (i)
R∗(θ) = E − C − (H−L)24θ for θ sufficiently high and as (ii) R∗(θ) = H − C − θ for θ
sufficiently low. I now show the first part of the claim.
Let θ ∈ (0,∞) be sufficiently high such that there exist some R2(θ) ∈ (max{E+L2 −
C, 0}, E −C) and R3(θ) ∈ (E −C, E+H2 −C) satisfying:
θ2(R2(θ)) = θ = θ3(R3(θ)) (3.29)
By (3.14), there exists such a θ ∈ (0,∞) satisfying (3.29). Also note that in this
case, one has ([0, H − C] × {θ}) ∩ (I3 ∪ I4 ∪ I5) = ∅ by (3.15) and therefore by











if R ∈ [0, R2(θ)]
if R ∈ [R2(θ), R3(θ)]
if R ∈ [R3(θ), H −C]
Note that an optimal price R∗(θ) must necessarily be in [R2(θ), R3(θ)]. I now check
that the seller’s objective function pia(R, θ)×R is strictly concave over [R2(θ), R3(θ)]
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and thus the optimal price must be unique. It is clear that pia(R, θ)×R is continu-
ously differentiable in R over the interval and thus verifying the strict concavity







In this case, the second order partial derivative in R vanishes and since ∂pia(R,θ)
∂R =
− 2θ(H−L)2 < 0, I conclude that pia(R, θ) × R is strictly concave. Now I want to see
when the optimal price R∗(θ) is equal to R2(θ) where I have R2(θ) = E −C − (H−L)24θ
from (3.14) . As pia(R, θ) × R is strictly concave, I have the following necessary
and sufficient first order condition for the optimality of R2(θ):
∂pia(R2(θ), θ)
∂R
R2(θ) + pia(R2(θ), θ) ≤ 0 (3.31)
It can be easily shown that condition (3.31) holds if and only if θ ≥ 3(H−L)22(E−C) . Thus
for sufficiently high θ, I have R∗(θ) = E − C − (H−L)24θ verifying the first part of the
claim.
Now I show the second part of the above claim. For this, let θ be sufficiently
low such that θ ≤ C − L. It can be easily verified by checking (3.15) that ([0, H −
C] × {θ}) ∩ (I2 ∪ I3) = ∅. Moreover, the sub-regions I5, I4 and I1decomposes the
interval [0, H−C] into [0, H−C−θ), [H−C−θ, H−C−θ p¯2L] and (H−C−θ p¯2L,H−C].





1 − p¯L( θH−C−R )1/2
0
if R ∈ [0, H −C − θ)
if R ∈ [H −C − θ, H −C − θ p¯2L]
if R ∈ (H −C − θ p¯2L,H −C]
Clearly, the optimal price R∗(θ) must be in [H −C − θ, H −C − θ p¯2L]. Now I want
to see when the seller’s objective function pia(R, θ) × R achieves its maximum at
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H − C − θ. First I verify that pia(R, θ) × R is strictly concave in R on the interval
[H −C − θ, H −C − θ p¯2L]. To do this I need to check the condition in (3.30). It can
be easily verified that condition (3.30) holds if and only if R < 4 (H −C) which is
true on the interval [H −C − θ, H −C − θ p¯2L] and so pia(R, θ)×R is strictly concave.
Likewise condition (3.31) above, the necessary and sufficient condition for the
point H −C − θ to be optimal is:
∂pia((H −C − θ), θ)
∂R
× (H −C − θ) + pia((H −C − θ), θ) ≤ 0 (3.32)
It can be easily shown that condition (3.32) can hold if and only if 1− p¯Lp¯L ≤ H−C−θ2θ .
Clearly, as θ gets smaller this inequality will hold. Thus, I conclude that for θ
sufficiently low the optimal price R∗(θ) is equal to H −C − θ as desired.
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